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THE LEGAL EDUCATION OF A PATRIOT:  
JOSIAH QUINCY JR.’S LAW COMMONPLACE (1763) 
 
 In the depths of the Massachusetts Historical Society, that hoary old guardian of 
American culture, sits a small, well-thumbed little notebook, in an ancient yellowed 
leather binding.  It does not look like much.  It belonged to Josiah Quincy Jr. (1744-
1775), a courageous patriot lawyer who died, only thirty-one years old, at the outbreak of 
the Revolution.  He was returning from London after a futile attempt, in collaboration 
with Benjamin Franklin, to gain English support for the patriot cause.1  He left only one 
surviving child, a son, also named Josiah, just three years old at his father’s death.  This 
little boy would become President of Harvard and Mayor of Boston.2 
 Perhaps because of a son’s admiration for a father he could hardly remember, and 
certainly because of a granddaughter’s devotion to a grandfather she never met, Quincy’s 
papers were carefully preserved.3  They included items of obvious importance: Quincy’s 
journal of his fatal, patriotic voyage to London in 1775; his law reports, Quincy’s 
Reports, the first in America; and an extraordinary journal of a trip to the South on behalf 
of the Committees of Correspondence in 1773.4  Compared to these, the little yellowed 
notebook seems relative obscure and easy to overlook.  Indeed, until now it has never 
been transcribed or published.5  But it is a book of the greatest importance.  Quincy’s 
Law Commonplace (for that is what it was called) represents a very rare and compelling 
vision into the early history of American legal education, the world before law schools.  
This little book hardly provides a complete picture, and there are many vital gaps, but it is 
unquestionably authentic.  Like the early fragments of human skulls found at Olduvai 
Gorge, the Law Commonplace provides a touchstone against which all our theories of our 
professional past must be tested. 
                                                 
1 See Portrait of a Patriot: The Major Political and Legal Papers of Josiah Quincy Junior (eds. D. R. 
Coquillette, N. L. York) vol. 1 (Boston, 2005), pp. 43-46.  (Hereafter, “Portrait of a Patriot, vol. 1”) 
2 See Robert A. McCaughey, Josiah Quincy, 1772-1864: The Last Federalist (Cambridge, 1974); Edmund 
Quincy, The Life of Josiah Quincy (Boston, 1867). 
3 Quincy’s granddaughter, Eliza Susan Quincy (1798-1884) was an extraordinary woman.  She was the true 
author of Josiah Quincy, Memoir of the Life of Josiah Quincy, Junior of Massachusetts: 1744-1775 
(Boston, 1825), and its later edition in 1874, published under her father’s name.  See Portrait of a Patriot, 
supra, vol. 1, pp. 9-10.  This very heavily edited collection of Quincy’s principal papers is now being 
replaced by a new scholarly edition, thanks to the generosity of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts.  The 
editors are Neil Longley York and Daniel R. Coquillette.  There will be four volumes, the first of which 
was published in 2005.  See Portrait of a Patriot, vol. 1, supra.  
4 Quincy’s The London Journal (1774-1775) was recently published in Portrait of a Patriot, supra, vol. 1, 
pp. 219-269, in a new edition beautifully edited by Neil Longley York.  Quincy’s Law Reports were first 
published by his great-grandson, Samuel Quincy, in 1865.  See Josiah Quincy, Reports of Cases Argued 
and Adjudged in the Superior Court of Judicature of the Province of Massachusetts Bay Between 1761 and 
1772 (Boston, 1865).  These will be republished in a new scholarly edition edited by Daniel R. Coquillette 
as Portrait of a Patriot, vols. 3 and 4.  See Daniel R. Coquillette, “First Flower – The Earliest American 
Law Reports and The Extraordinary Josiah Quincy Jr. (1744-1775),” 30 Suffolk University Law Review 
(1990).  Quincy’s The Southern Journal (1773) will be republished in Portrait of a Patriot, vol. 2, also 
edited by Daniel R. Coquillette.   
5 Overlooked by Eliza Quincy and subsequent editors, Quincy’s The Law Commonplace will be published 
for the first time in Portrait of a Patriot, vol. 2, edited by Daniel R. Coquillette.  The debt owed to the 
Colonial Society of Massachusetts for supporting this massive project is enormous.  Especially helpful was 
John W. Tyler, the Colonial Society’s exceptional Editor of Publications. 
 4
 Much has been written about the history of American legal education.  And 
almost all of it is about law schools.  Literally hundreds of volumes have described the 
hundreds of professional schools established in North America, from the prototype 
Litchfield Law School of 1784 to 1833 to the newly published account of the “Dark 
Ages” of the 1960s through the early 1980s at Yale Law School.6  Even the different, but 
related, phenomenon of teaching law to undergraduates as a “liberal art,” which began 
when Thomas Jefferson established the Professorship of Law and Police at The College 
of William and Mary in 1779, has been carefully chronicled.7  But the lawyers who 
founded this nation and defended the early Republic, famous lawyers, learned most of 
their law a very different way.  Take Massachusetts as an example.  John Adams, Robert 
Treat Paine and James Otis, Jr. were great lawyers, but they never attended a law school.  
Neither did Patrick Henry, Joseph Story, James Monroe or Thomas Jefferson.  John 
Marshall was another, if one overlooks a brief tuition from George Wythe while Wythe 
was at William and Mary.8  Story and Jefferson established great law schools, but they 
did not learn law that way themselves. 
 
 Of course, the primary method for learning law in the American colonial period 
was apprenticeship.  That would be true for much of the next century, too.  Perhaps 
because most books about legal education are written by law professors, apprenticeship 
as a pedagogy and a course of study has been widely overlooked and belittled.9  The 
                                                 
6 See Robert Stevens’ classic Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s 
(Chapel Hill, 1983)  (Hereafter “Stevens”).  For both Litchfield and Yale in the 1960s see the fine essays of 
John H. Langbein and Laura Kalman, respectively, in History of Yale Law School: The Tercentennial 
Lectures (New Haven, 2004), 17-52, 154-237. 
7 See Paul D. Carrington, “The Revolutionary Idea of University Legal Education,” 31 William & Mary L. 
Rev. 527 (1990).  (Hereafter, “Carrington, University Legal Education”). 
8 Wythe, a great law teacher, did most of his teaching outside of a college, taking pupils in his chambers.  
Wythe taught at William and Mary from only 1780 to 1790, when he resigned “in anger.”  See Carrington, 
“University Legal Education,” supra, p. 537.  Jefferson and Monroe were educated by Wythe privately.  
Interestingly, Wythe refused to sign Patrick Henry’s license, leaving it to the other two examinees to admit 
him.  See Charles Warren, A History of the American Bar (Boston, 1911), 165.  (Hereafter, “Warren”). 
9 See the standard accounts in Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Rise of the Legal Profession in America, 
Volume 1: The Colonial Experience (Norman, Okla., 1965), pp. 30-33.  (“This kind of training or 
apprenticeship…had many serious defects.” p.33); Warren, supra, pp. 165-187 (“As a rule, the lawyer was 
too busy a man to pay much attention to his students…” p. 166).  See also Robert Lefcourt’s 1983 Ph. D. 
thesis, “Democratic Influences on Legal Education from Colonial Times to the Civil War,” University 
Microfilms Internation, Ann Arbor, which argues that the primary purpose of the apprenticeship method, 
described as “irrelevant and impractical,” was the “monopolistic tendency” of “ruling lawyers.”  Id., pp. 
72-79.  Even Lawrence M. Friedman emphasized the negative aspects of apprenticeship. “At worst, an 
apprentice went through a haphazard course of drudgery and copy-work, with a few glances, catch-or-catch 
can, at the law books.” Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law (2d ed., New York, 1985), p. 
98.  Of course there were some well publicized bad experiences, such as that of William Livingston’s 1745 
“invective” against his pupil master, James Alexander of New York.  See Warren, pp. 167-169.  But, as we 
will see, there was another side to the story.  The best and most balanced account is Charles R. McKirdy’s 
“The Lawyer As Apprentice: Legal Education in Eighteenth Century Massachusetts,” 28 J. of Legal 
Education (1976), p. 124.  McKirdy astutely observes that “Sir William Blackstone took the opportunity 
offered in his introductory Vinerian Lecture at Oxford [1758] to blame most of the ills besetting the legal 
profession on the ‘pernicious’ custom of apprenticeship.”  Id., p. 135.  See William Blackstone, A 
Discourse on the Study of Law (Oxford, 1758), p. 28.  As the first teacher of English common law within a 
university setting, Blackstone’s conflict of interest was apparent.  And Blackstone inspired other university 
law teachers to attack the apprenticeship method.  Conspicuous among these was Daniel Mayes at the 
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popular conception is that apprentices were educated by chance, picking up whatever 
learning they could while copying documents and running errands for their indifferent 
masters.10  Possibly there would be useful books in their master’s libraries, possibly not.  
Possibly they would have the chance to browse in whatever books there were, but it 
would all be happenstance.  Certainly, whatever instruction there was would be practical, 
not theoretical, and would focus on local, not national law, or – even more inconceivable 
– international law! 
 
 But the history of the pre-revolutionary bar seems most odd if this were truly the 
case.  Take, for example, the legal world of 1773 described in Quincy’s Southern 
Journal, set out above.  While there was an occasional lawyer who had “experience” at 
the remarkably lax Inn of Court in London, particularly in the South, most of Quincy’s 
professional acquaintances in South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Delaware and 
Pennsylvania were taught by apprenticeship.11  Yet there was a clear sense of a legal 
elite, with a firmly established professional identity.  John Adam’s Diary paints a similar 
picture – a self-defined and small professional elite, set apart by education and skill from 
a host of “petty foggers”.12  It is true Quincy had a low opinion of the training of some of 
                                                                                                                                                 
important Transylvania University Law Department in Lexington, Kentucky, who cited Blackstone while 
attacking apprenticeship in an introductory lecture in 1833.  See M. H. Hoeflich, “Plus Ca Change, Plus 
C’est La Meme Chise: The Integration of Theory and Practice in Legal Education”, 66 Temple Law Review 
p. 123, 133-134 (1993).  See also Paul D. Carrington’s excellent essay, “Teaching Law and Virtue at 
Transylvania University: The George Wythe Tradition in the Antebellum Years”, 41 Mercer Law Review 
673 (1989-1990), pp. 691-696, 697-699.  As Hoeflich observes, “One of the ‘hot’ topics in legal education 
has been the debate over the extent to which it is desirable and possible to integrate a more practical 
approach into the predominately theoretical classroom model of legal education used in most American law 
schools.”  Id., p. 123.  Indeed, nothing changes. 
10 Warren actually tried to make the argument that apprenticeship was such a bad system that it made good 
lawyers because they had so much to overcome, an argument I would like to try on my law students! 
“When all is said, however, as to the meagerness of a lawyer’s education, one fact must be strongly 
emphasized – that this very meagerness was a source of strength.  Mutum in parvo was particularly 
applicable to the training for the Bar of that era.”  Warren, supra, p. 187.  Of course, what could be 
expected from the great historian of the Harvard Law School!  See Charles Warren, History of the Harvard 
Law School and of Early Legal Conditions in America (New York, 1908), 3 vols. 
11 See E. Alfred Jones, American Members of the Inns of Court (London, 1924), pp. ix-xxx.  Between 1674 
to 1776 over sixty Virginians attended the Inns of Court, “but only twenty engaged in practice once they 
got home,” and of these “some never practiced.”  W. Hamilton Bryson, Legal Education in Virginia 1779-
1979 (Charlottesville, 1982), p. 9.  Formal educational programs had deteriorated in the Inns of Court by 
this time.  “The essence of membership in an English Inn was that it was a prestigious place to do a legal 
apprenticeship,” usually by “an apprenticeship to a practicing lawyer in London with residence in the Inn.” 
Id., p. 9.  “In fact, many Virginians who were members of an Inn had no intention of ever practicing law 
but joined for purely social purposes.” Id., p. 9.  On the “marked decay” in the “‘system’ of legal 
education” in the Inns of Court, see David Lemmings, Gentlemen and Barristers:  The Inns of Court and 
The English Bar 1686-1730 (Oxford, 1980), pp. 75-109. 
12 See Diary and Autobiography of John Adams (L.H. Butterfield ed., Cambridge, Mass., 1964), vol. 1, pp. 
136-137, vol. 2, p. 274.  (Hereafter, “Adams, Diary”).  See also Daniel R. Coquillette, “Justinian in 
Braintree: John Adams, Civilian Learning, and Legal Elitism, 1758-1775” in Law in Colonial 
Massachusetts 1630-1800 (eds. D.R. Coquillette, R.J. Brink, C.S. Menard, Boston, 1984), pp. 395-400.  
(Hereafter, “Coquillette, Adams”).  For the highly comparable history of medical apprenticeship or 
pupilage and the “professionalization of Boston medicine during the last half of the eighteenth century,” 
see Philip Cash, “The Professionalization of Boston Medicine, 1760-1803” in Medicine in Colonial 
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the Southern lawyers he met, particularly in South Carolina, but that, in itself, speaks of 
professional standards. 
 
 My thesis is that, at its best, elite legal apprenticeship had both a pedagogy and a 
curricular structure that was far from random.  It was also neither “local” nor necessarily 
“practical” in its forms, and it could include comparative study, particularly of Roman 
law.  This education may not have been ideal, nor uniformly excellent, but given a good 
tutor and a good student it was rigorous enough to explain the strong sense of legal 
professionalism to be found in America before the Revolution. 
 
 Why has this been so overlooked?  First, the institutional records of this type of 
legal education are relatively scarce.  The few that have survived tend to be the legal 
commonplace books of the apprentices, and these, although not rare, have rarely been 
published.  This alone makes Quincy’s Law Commonplace of 1763 an important 
document, and it has never been transcribed or published until now.  Unless included in 
the papers of an Adams or a Jefferson, such records have usually been inaccessible to all 
but a handful of scholars. 13 
 
 But there is a further reason.  Most American legal historians, even those who are 
not trained as lawyers, have been subconsciously “brainwashed” by two powerful, and 
complementary, visions of legal education, which have been superimposed on each other.  
The first was the vision of Joseph Story (1779-1845), at age thirty-two, the youngest 
Justice of the Supreme Court ever appointed and, at age forty-nine, the “Savior of 
Harvard Law School”.  Founded by the proceeds of the will of Isaac Royall in 1817, the 
Harvard Law School had failed to compete effectively with apprenticeship and was down 
                                                                                                                                                 
Massachusetts (eds. P. Cash, E. H. Christianson, J. W. Estes) Boston, 1980, pp. 69-100.  The “Harvard 
Medical Institution,” the area’s first medical school, was not founded until 1782.  Id., p. 89.   
13 One of these exceptions is John Adam’s law “Commonplace Book.”  See Legal Papers of John Adams 
(eds. L. Kinvin Wroth, Hiller B. Zobel, Cambridge, 1976), vol. 1, pp. 4-25.  This dates from ca. 1759 and is 
a very rudimentary affair compared to Quincy’s Law Commonplace.  Another exception is Thomas 
Jefferson’s Legal Commonplace Book, which was edited by Gilbert Chinard in 1926.  See The 
Commonplace Book of Thomas Jefferson: A Repertory of his Ideas on Government (G. Chinard ed., 
Baltimore, 1926) and the discussion in Douglas L. Wilson, “Thomas Jefferson’s Early Notebooks,” 42 
William and Mary Quarterly (1985), 433-452.  Jefferson also had an Equity Commonplace Book which is 
in the Huntington Library.  See the discussion in Douglas L. Wilson’s fine edition of Jefferson’s Literary 
Commonplace Book (D. L. Wilson ed., Princeton 1989) p. 195 n. 195 and in his article cited above.  Wilson 
sets the date for the beginning of Jefferson’s Legal Commonplace Book as “the period 1765-1766” which 
makes it almost exactly a contemporary of Quincy’s book.  Id., p. 198 n. 14. 
See also the remarkable commonplace collection, spanning the 17th century to 1935, found in the Bounds 
Law Library at the University of Alabama School of Law and described in Paul M. Pruitt, Jr., David I. 
Durham, Commonplace Book of Law: A Selection of Related Notebooks from the Seventeenth Century to 
the Mid-Twentieth Century (Tuscaloosa, 2005).  An important exception was the exhibit at the Beinecke 
Rare Book and Manuscript Library at Yale, organized by Earle Havens in 2001.  See Earle Havens, 
Commonplace Books: A History of Manuscripts and Printed Books from Antiquity to the Twentieth Century 
(New Haven, 2001).  My own distinguished colleague, Karen Beck, organized an equally important exhibit 
of law student notebooks at the Boston College Law School Rare Books Room in 1999.  See Karen Beck, 
Notable Notes: A Collection of Law Student Notebooks, Boston, 1999; Karen Beck, “One Step at a Time: 
The Research Value of Student Notebooks,” 91 Law Library, p. 29 (1999).  The latter article emphasizes 
the importance of the law commonplace of Theophilius Parsons Sr. (1750-1813), created in 1773.  Id., p. 
32.  See Theophilius Parsons, Jr., Memoir of Theophilius Parsons (Boston, 1859), p. 137.  
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to one student in 1829.14  A generous donor, Nathan Dane, agreed to establish a newly 
endowed professorship, but only on the condition that Story would take it.  Without 
abandoning his judicial career, Story took this position as well. 
  
 He had a simple formula for success.  Harvard Law School must become an elite, 
national institution, drawing students from all states.  To do that, it must offer broad 
instruction in legal theory, legal history, comparative and international law, and 
constitutional law.15  Its graduates would be the meritocrats of the new Republic, 
displacing both the hereditary oligarchy of the Federalists and the egalitarianism of the 
Jacksonian Democrats.16  The cornerstone of the pedagogy would be well-organized 
treatises, which Story himself would write as part of his duties.  Readings from these 
would be required for each class, and the teacher would reinforce each section by 
lecturing, backed up further by a second teacher, who was called a “crammer.”  This was 
initially John Ashmun.  The “crammer” would drill the class in the lessons learned.  The 
competition was, throughout, with apprenticeship. Story and his intellectual heirs at 
Harvard had every incentive to describe the apprenticeship process as haphazard and 
parochial. 
 
 Harvard Law School and its peers have remained national and elitist, just as Story 
had hoped.  But the Civil War greatly damaged the very sense of “nation” that Story 
extolled.17  A returning veteran, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., found the School in 
shambles, and said so publicly.18  Once again a savior was needed.  In a brilliant move, 
the newly appointed President of Harvard, Charles Eliot, turned to a practicing lawyer 
with no educational experience, and made Christopher Columbus Langdell the Dean in 
1871. 
 
 Langdell had impressed Eliot, a chemist, with the idea that law could be taught as 
a science, “dissecting” appellate cases to discover the underlying principles of the law, 
just as chemistry is taught through experiments, or biology through dissection of 
organisms.  Langdell published the first casebook in 187119, and began teaching courses 
by the “Socratic” method, questioning students on the assigned cases, rather than 
lecturing from treatises.  Despite early protests, this “interactive” pedagogy became a 
great success.  Langdell also organized the curriculum into the required first year courses 
familiar today, the ideological “cubbyholes” of contract, tort, property, procedure, and, in 
                                                 
14 See Arthur E. Sutherland, The Law at Harvard (Cambridge, MA, 1967), pp. 79-92.  (Hereafter, 
“Sutherland”). 
15 See Daniel R. Coquillette, “‘Mourning Venice and Genoa’: Joseph Story, Legal Education, and the Lex 
Mercatoria” in From Lex Mercatoria to Commerical Law (ed. Vito Piergiovanni, Berlin, 2005), pp. 14 - 
26.  (Hereafter, “Coquillette, Joseph Story”).  See also Sutherland, supra, pp. 92-139; R. Kent Newmyer, 
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old Republic (Chapel Hill, 1985), pp. 237-270.  
(Hereafter, “Newmyer”). 
16 See Coquillette, Story, supra, pp. 14 - 26; Newmyer, supra, 269-271.  Newmyer observes that “much of 
Story’s grand plan for a cadre of conservative lawyer-statesmen went unrealized.”  Id., p. 269.  This may be 
a fair statement in the short run, but the future of Harvard Law School surely provided such a “cadre”! 
17 See Sutherland, supra, pp. 140-161. 
18 See the American Law Review (October, 1870), “Summary of Events,” set out at Sutherland, supra, p. 
140.  See also Warren, supra, pp. 342-378. 
19 Christopher Columbus Langdell, Cases on Contracts, (Cambridge, Mass., 1871). 
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some instances, criminal law.  The power of this first year “boot camp” on the intellectual 
development of modern American lawyers has been profound.  “Thinking like a lawyer” 
has been defined by this educational experience for a century. 
 
 Those conditioned by the legal pedagogy of Story and Langdell look at the elite 
apprenticeships of the pre-revolutionary period and see nothing familiar, and, therefore, 
are inclined to see nothing.  Quincy’s Law Commonplace does not use the intellectual 
“cubbyholes” of Story’s treatises or of Langdell’s curriculum.  But it is highly structured 
in its own way.  Apprenticeship was not taught by lecture or by the Socratic method, but 
it had its own pedagogy and its own theory of learning, and it was a fairly formal theory, 
at that. 
 
 Leading intellectuals of the seventeenth-century profession, including Francis 
Bacon, Mathew Hale, and John Locke, advocated a “two-pronged” approach to learning 
law: learning by “maxims” and learning by “commonplacing.”  As we will see in 
Quincy’s Law Commonplace, these were closely related pedagogies, and each had an 
extensive common law literature.20  It was Bacon’s belief that all education was based on 
four “rational arts:” “the Art of Custody or Memory,” the “Art of Elocution [or 
Transmission],” the “Art of Inquiry or Invention” and the “Art of Examination or 
Judgment.”21  The first two “arts” are appropriate to basic education.  You need to 
“memorize” the vocabulary and the structure of a science, or a language, before you can 
progress, and you need to know how the science or language is transmitted, by books or 
other sources, and how to find what you need to know.  The second two “rational arts” 
are more appropriate for advanced study – how to design original research, the “art of 
inquiry,” and how to exercise mature judgment, and distinguish between the foolish and 
the wise.  The latter art, Bacon maintained, had to be taught by experience. 
 
 Bacon, like many of his contemporaries of the Enlightenment, saw “maxims” as 
an ideal way to memorize and to store legal knowledge.  Often based on Roman models, 
such maxims would be a “search engine” for relevant precedents and authorities, in a day 
long before word searchable texts.  Mathew Hale, and other less well-known 
contemporaries, linked learning by maxims with keeping commonplace books, both for 
students and practitioners.  The commonplace book was usually organized around 
alphabetical topics, but these topics often were suggested by, or contained, maxims. 
 
 Keeping a law commonplace was not “interactive” in the same way as being 
interrogated by a “crammer” after one of Story’s lectures, or being cross-examined by a 
“Socratic” law professor pursuing Langdell’s case method.  But it was an active, and 
often creative and critical process, in which the student interrogated the basic sources of 
the law and distilled, for the student’s own purposes, the essence of the law.  And this 
process was hardly unstructured.  As we shall see, Quincy was very much aware of John 
Locke’s “A New Method of a Common-place book,” first published in French as 
                                                 
20 See Section I “The Pedagogy,” supra. 
21 See discussion in Daniel R. Coquillette, “’The Purer Fountains: Bacon and Legal Education,” in Francis 
Bacon and the Refiguring of Early Modern Thought: Essays to Commemorate the Advancement of 
Learning (1605-2005) (ed. J. R. Solomon, C. G. Martin, eds., London, 2005), pp. 145-172. 
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“Methode nouvelle de dresser des Recueils” in the Biblothe’que Choisie in July, 1686, 
and then translated into English in 1697, as well as Mathew Hale’s Preface to Rolle’s 
Abridgment of 1668, which specifically addressed legal “commonplacing.”22  Not only 
did he follow these guides, but he created both an initial index and a sophisticated final 
cross-index, that linked comparable subjects and ideas.  Finally, he did not just copy the 
relevant sections of cases and treatises, but condensed and arranged them in a highly 
individual way, using both American and English sources, and cross-citing to his own 
manuscript Law Reports of cases in the Massachusetts Superior Court of Judicature.  He 
also, on occasion, criticized these sources, marking “query” in the margins and noting 
inconsistencies.  Indeed, compared to the passive, painstaking note-taking and copying of 
a Litchfield student and the treatise based lectures of Story’s Harvard Law School, 
Quincy’s Law Commonplace seems original and analytical, not unlike the interactive 
pedagogical goals of Langdell’s “Socratic” method, the “modern” approach that evolved 
more than a century later. 
 
 There was one final surprise.  In Volumes 3 and 4 (1764-1765) of Quincy’s four 
original notebooks there are 22 pages of Latin Maxims, now brilliantly translated and 
annotated by Elizabeth Papp Kamali.23  These maxims, in turn, were hardly random, and 
reflected a letter of advice on Roman law by Professor Francis Dickins, who taught 
Roman Law at Cambridge from 1714-1755 as the 16th Regis Professor of Civil Law.  
This letter, originally addressed to Jeremy Gridley, law tutor to John Adams and dean of 
the Boston bar, was copied into Quincy’s Note Book, Volume 4, at pages 148-150, by 
another hand.  So learning by maxims and commonplacing extended, at least in Quincy’s 
case, to comparative legal studies.  Roman Law was the common denominator with the 
continental legal system of the day, as well as the basis of the Admiralty proceedings so 
important to New England, not to mention the Spanish and French possessions in the 
New World, including Louisiana.24  It was hardly an archaic exercise, but rather a link 
between Quincy’s legal studies and the world beyond the seas. 
 
 In short, Quincy’s Law Commonplace is important.  It is not just important 
because its author was a courageous patriot and, by all accounts, a brilliant man.  It is also 
a particularly complete and convincing evidence of how the elites of the Pre-
Revolutionary bar learned law, by apprenticeship, structured and focused by a pedagogy 
of maxims and commonplacing.  It may not be our modern idea of legal education, but it 
was serious legal education nevertheless.  To the extent that it offered a very different 
pedagogy to that which dominates modern American legal education, it remains 
fascinating to innovators and reformers.25  To the extent such an education strengthened 
                                                 
22 See Section I, “The Pedagogy”, supra. 
23 The Latin Maxims will be published in Portrait of a Patriot: The Major Political and Legal Papers of 
Josiah Quincy Junior, vol. 2, as Appendix III. 
24 John Adams appreciated this fact, and not only trained himself in Roman law, but used it systematically 
in his Vice-Admiralty practice.  See Coquillette, Adams, supra, pp. 382-395. 
25 See M.H. Hoeflich, “Plus ca Change, Plus c’est la Meme Chose: The Integration of Theory and Practice 
in Legal Education,” 66 Temple L. Rev. 123 (1993), pp. 123-127.  William R. Trail, William D. 
Underwood, “The Decline of Professional Legal Training and a Proposal for its Revitalization in 
Professional Law Schools,” 48 Baylor L. Rev. 201 (1996), pp. 201-208, 210-211, 244-245. 
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I. THE PEDAGOGY 
 
 Quincy began his Law Commonplace on September 24, 1763.  At the time, legal 
education in the common law world was in a state of flux, and dramatic changes were on 
the horizon.  Only five years before, in 1758, William Blackstone had taken the Vinerian 
Chair at Oxford.  There, he had commenced his famous annual lectures that introduced, 
for the first time, common law study to an English university.26  And only two years 
before Quincy began his work, in 1761, Francis Stoughton Sullivan publish his 
revolutionary A Plan for the Study of the Feudal and English Laws in the University of 
Dublin (hereafter, “A Plan”) outlining a complete two year method of learning law, 
emphasizing “the elementary parts” and developing “the Outlines of the remaining Heads 
of the Law, with the necessary Definitions, Divisions, Maxims and Illustrations, such as 
the young Gentleman may receive with Ease, and retain without Confusion, and may 
afterwards fill up at their leisure by their subsequent heading, and their Attendance at 
Westminster.”27 
 
 Now let us look forward just two years in the future.  In 1765, Blackstone would 
publish the first volume of his famous Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-
1770), whose success in the American colonies would be phenomenal.28  Had Quincy 
only been permitted an ordinary adult life, he would have witnessed Thomas Jefferson’s 
establishment of a professorship of “Law and Police” at William and Mary in 1779 and 
                                                 
26 See F.H. Lawson, The Oxford Law School 1850-1965 (Oxford, 1968), pp. 4-5 (hereafter “Lawson”); 
Arthur E. Sutherland, The Law at Harvard (Cambridge, Mass. 1967), pp. 19-25 (hereafter, “Sutherland”).  
Lawson was certainly right in observing that “Blackstone exerted a greater influence in the North American 
colonies and subsequently in the United States than in England…” Lawson, p. 4.  But both the theoretical 
style and the politics of his Commentaries earned Blackstone powerful enemies, such as Thomas Jefferson.  
Jefferson, writing to Madison in 1826, observed that when “the honied Mansfieldism of Blackstone became 
the student’s hornbook, from that moment, that profession (the nursery of our Congress), began to slide into 
toryism…”  Thomas Jefferson, Works (P.L. Ford, ed., New York, 1905) vol. 12, pp. 455-456.  See 
Sutherland, p. 13.  Blackstone still has his pedagogical enemies.  See Duncan Kennedy, “The Structure of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries,” 28 Buffalo Law Review 205 (1979).  In addition, a good deal of the practiced 
legal training in England was outside both the Inns of Court and the universities, and remained more 
practical than formal.  See David Lemmings, Professors of the Law, Barristers and English Legal Culture 
in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 2000), pp. 107-148. 
27 Francis Soughton Sullivan, A Plan For the Study of the Feudal and English Laws in the University of 
Dublin (Dublin, 1761), p. 4. 
28 At least one thousand sets were exported to America before 1771, when a pirated edition was published 
in Philadelphia by Robert Bell.  One thousand and four hundred copies were subscribed in advance, with 
one New York dealer taking two hundred and thirty nine.  See Sutherland, p. 25.  Although Blackstone’s 
Commentaries were not available to Quincy when he began the Law Commonplace, he owned a set at his 
death in 1775.  See Quincy’s Reports, Appendix 9, “Catalogue of Books Belonging to the Estate of Josiah 
Quincy Jun: Esq: Deceas’d”, Item 67.  In addition, there is one citation to the first volume (1765) of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries at Law Commonplace, p. 94 [82], which may be a later addition.  There are 
several citations to Blackstone’s earlier Analysis of the Laws of England (Oxford, 1756).  See Law 
Commonplace, pp. n. p. [6], n. p. [10] and 89 [77]. 
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the beginning of George Wythe’s teaching career.29  He also would have witnessed James 
Wilson’s appointment in 1789 as professor of law at the University of Pennsylvania, and 
James Kent’s appointment to a similar position at Columbia in 1794.  Had Quincy lived 
to be only forty, he would have seen Judge Tapping Reeve establish the nation’s first 
professional law school, the famous Litchfield School of Law, in 1784, and had Quincy 
lived to seventy-three he would have witnessed the founding of the Harvard Law School 
in 1817, America’s first university professional school of law. 
 
 John Langbein has demonstrated that these historical forces were about pedagogy, 
how law was taught and learned.30  Langbein argues that Litchfield succeeded because of 
its system of lecturing, “which had been such an advance over the apprenticeship in the 
1780s.”  But that system became “retrograde” by the 1830s, and was surpassed by a 
“different and superior technique, the so-called text-and-recitation system” established by 
the university professional schools, including Harvard and Yale.31 
 
 But this is what makes Quincy’s Law Commonplace so important.  Because it was 
begun before Blackstone and these major institutional pedagogies, it remains a largely 
“pure” example of the ancestral learning from which these dramatic innovations evolved.  
And, because its author was a brilliant – if very young – lawyer, it presents this 
pedagogical heritage at its best.  Finally, this document challenges Langbein’s 
assumption that pedagogical evolution was inherently an “advance.”32  At its best, 
apprenticeship, and its attendant learning techniques of commonplacing and instruction 
by maxims, could be a sophisticated and effective way to learn. 
 
 To begin, Quincy’s Law Commonplace was a “system” with three separate 
elements.  The “core” was the pre-indexed commonplace contained in his notebook “Vol. 
1,” pp. 1-98 (P347, Reel 4, QP56).  This was obviously a pre-designed project, following 
the methodologies of John Locke and Mathew Hale.  It could have been designed by 
Quincy’s pupil master, Oxenbridge Thacher, but there were plenty of other possible 
sources.33  This was analogous to the “elementary parts” of the law, emphasized by 
Francis Stoughton Sullivan’s Plan of 1761. 
                                                 
29 See Paul D. Carrington, “The Revolutionary Idea of University Legal Education,” 31 William & Mary 
Law Review 527 (1990), p. 527-538.  (Hereafter, “Carrington, University Legal Education”). 
30 See John H. Langbein, “Blackstone, Litchfield, and Yale: The Founding of the Yale Law School,” 
History of the Yale Law School (ed. Anthony T. Kronman, New Haven, 2004), pp. 17-36.  (Hereafter, 
“Langbein, The Founding”). 
31 Id., p. 30. 
32 Id., p. 30. 
33 Oxenbridge Thacher (1719-1765) was one of Boston’s most “eminent lawyers of the period.”  See the 
biography set out in Appendix 6 to the Reports, vol. 4, infra.  He was Quincy’s law tutor from 1763 to 
Thacher’s death in July, 1765.  See Josiah Quincy, Memoir of the Life of Josiah Quincy, Jr. (2d ed., Boston, 
1874), pp. 6-7.  (Hereafter, “Memoir”).  See also Clifford K. Shipton, Sibley’s Harvard Graduate, vol. xv: 
Biographical Sketches of Those Who Attended Harvard College in the Classes 1761-1763 (Boston, 1970), 
p. 479.  On Thacher’s death in 1765, Quincy “took over the office and as much of the practice as he could 
handle.”  Id., p. 479.  According to John Adams, Thacher believed strongly in commonplacing.  “He 
[Thacher] says He is sorry that he neglected to keep a Common Place Book when he began to study Law, 
and he is half a mind to being now.”  Diary and Autobiography of John Adams (L.H. Butterfield, ed., New 
York, 1964), vol. 1, p. 55 (October 25, 1758).  (Hereafter, “Adam’s Diary”). 
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 Then there was the second element, the Legis Miscellanea contained in Quincy’s 
notebook “Vol. 1,” pp. 150-182 and in “Vol. 4,” pp. 5-10, indexed retroactively and cross 
referenced to the “core” commonplace.  This would be analogous to the “afterwards fill 
up at their Leisure” outlines of Sullivan’s Plan.  It would be an ongoing project, to be 
continued by the apprentice or student.  While Quincy’s Legis Miscellanea lacked the 
prearranged “outlines of the remaining Heads of the Law, with the necessary Definitions, 
Divisions, Maxims and Illustrations” prescribed by Sullivan’s method, the index prepared 
retroactively by Quincy did supply the principal “Heads of the Law,” arranged 
alphabetically, which also provided easy cross-referencing to the “core” commonplace. 
 
 Finally, there was Quincy’s unique contribution to his “system,” his Law Reports.  
These were begun in 1761, two years before the Law Commonplace and actively 
continued throughout the creation of the Law Commonplace, until the first gap in the 
August Term, 1768.  The Legis Miscellanea sections of the Law Commonplace cross-
referenced the Law Reports.34  The Law Reports also occasionally cited to related 
materials in the Law Commonplace.  For instance, one such cross-reference appears in 
the case of Banister v. Henderson, which begins on page 12 of Quincy’s volume 3 (page 
119 of the 1865 published Reports).  At the beginning of the case, Quincy cross-
referenced to page 103 [89] of volume 1, the Law Commonplace, though this cross-
reference was not included in the 1865 publication.  Page 103 [89] of the Law 
Commonplace includes the minutes of Banister v. Cunningham, an earlier case which 
dealt with a controversy over the same estate contested in Banister v. Henderson, and 
demonstrates that the two volumes are interconnected by Quincy’s method. 
 
 These cross-references were largely gathered in a separate section which followed 
the alphabetized “core” Commonplace after three blank pages, Quincy pp. 99-102, and 
went from Quincy page 103 up to page 107 [Transcription pp. [87]-[92].  For 
convenience, this section will be called the “Case Notes Section,” although Quincy did 
not label it at all.  This “Case Notes Section” also contained cross-references to Quincy’s 
“Law file C” and “Law file A,” which contained notes of legal arguments, decided cases, 
and methods for studying law, like Chief Justice Mathew Hale’s “Method of studying the 
Common Law from Rolls’s Abr.g Preface” and Chief Justice Thomas Reeve’s “To his 
Nephew, Directions for beginning the Study of Law.”  See Law Commonplace, Quincy 
n.p., [transcription p. 7] and n.p. [transcription p. 9]. 
 
 It is easier to appreciate this sophisticated system of information retrieval using a 
diagram: 
 
                                                 
34 See, for example, the citation at Law Commonplace, Quincy, page 105 [transcript 90] to “Red Rep. 70 
Angier vs. Jackson.”  That is a citation to Quincy’s “red” notebook, P347 Reel 4 QP55 (now rebound in 
brown), which contained the manuscript of his report of Angier v. Jackson, Reports, p. 84.  As Samuel M. 
Quincy observed in his “Preface” to the Reports, this volume had “paper covers, (from the original color of 
which it is referred to as ‘Red Reports,’).”  See Reports, p. iii.  Quincy also crossed referenced the 
important case of Baker v. Mattocks at Law Commonplace, Quincy, page 106 [transcript 91].  Baker v. 
Mattocks was in the “Red Reports” at page 57, and in the Reports at page 69.  I am most grateful to Kevin 
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If Quincy wished to update his “core commonplace,” he could add to the Legis 
Miscellanea or to the “Case Note Section.”  The “Case Note Section” was cross-
referenced to his Law Reports.  Both the “core” commonplace and the retroactive index 
to the Legis Miscellanea, which was updated, were organized in alphabetical headings.  
And there were cross-references to his “Law file A” and “Law file C”.  All he needed to 
do was remember the right alphabetical heading, and he could locate anything in the 
commonplace! 
 
 But this was not just a way of storing and cross-referencing information.  It was a 
program to teach law.  Setting up and compiling a commonplace was hard work.  
Updating it and cross-referencing the categories was even harder.  Creating reports of 
argued cases and referencing those reports to the commonplace was harder still.  It was a 
process that required “trial and error”.  It taught by requiring the student to do the 
analysis and classification for himself.  Again, this is the same way that the Socratic 
method and the case method taught law, by interaction between the student and the 
material. 
 
 We do not have to speculate on the sources of Quincy’s pedagogy, because he 
carefully copied them into the Law Commonplace itself.  The most important was Chief 
Justice Mathew Hale (1609-1676).  Hale’s “Publisher’s Preface Directed to the Young 
Students of the Common Law” appearing at the beginning of Henry Rolle’s Un 
Abridgment Des Plusieurs Cases…Del Common Ley… (London, 1668) (hereafter “Hale’s 
Preface”), was carefully copied by Quincy into “Vol. 1,” P 347, Reel 4, QP56, Quincy’s 
pages 122-141 (not transcribed in this series as not original Quincy).  Hale believed that 
direct interaction between the student and the undigested mass of the law was necessary 
and desirable, and that struggle was a part of learning.  According to Hale, 
 
 “It is true, a student will waste much Paper this way, and possibly in two or three 
 years will see many Errors and Impertinencies in what he hath formerly done, and 
 much irregularity and disorder in the disposing of his matter under proper Heads.  
 But he will have these infallible Advantages attending his course.  1.  In process 
 of time he will be more perfect and dexterous in this business.  2.  Those 
 imperfect and disordered essays will by frequent returns upon them, be 
 intelligible, at least, to himself, and refresh his memory.  3.  He will be this means 
 keep together under apt titles whatsoever he hath read.  4.  By often returning 
 upon every title, as occasions of search or new intentions require, he will 
 strangely revive and imprint in his memory what he hath formerly read.  5.  He 
 will be able at one view to feel the substance of whatsoever he hath read 
 concerning any one Subject, without turning to every Book (only when he hath 
 particular occasion of Advice, or Argument, then it will be necessary to look upon 
 that Book at large, which he findes useful to his purpose.  6.  He will be able upon 
 any occasion suddenly to find anything he hath read, without recoursing to Tables 
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 or other Repertories, which are oftentimes short, and give a lame account of the 
 subject sought for…”35 
 
 Also important to Quincy was Chief Justice Thomas Reeve’s (? – 1773) 
“Directions [to his Nephews] for beginning the study of Law,” which Quincy copied into 
the beginning of his Law Commonplace on unnumbered pages (transcription pages [7]-
[9]) (hereafter, “Reeve’s Directions to his Nephew”).  See “Vol. 1,” P347, Reel 4, QP56, 
unnumbered Quincy introduction.  Reeve emphasized the effort of commonplacing, using 
Thomas Wood’s An Institute of the Laws of England; or Laws of England in their natural 
order according to Common use (1st ed., London, 1720) (hereafter, “Wood’s Institute of 
the Laws of England”) “to understand the several Divisions of the Law, + obtain the 
precise Ideas used in it.”36  Reeves went on: 
 
 “My whole scheme without naming Books, is no more than this. 
 1.st Obtain precise ideas of the Terms + several meaning of the Law. 2.dly Learn 
 the general Reasons whereon the Law is founded. 3. dly Find some authentic 
 system, collect the great heading Points of the Laws, in their natural order, as the 
 first Heads + Divisions of your future enquiry; 4.thly Collect the several particular 
 Points + arrange them under their generals, as they occur + as you find you can 
 best digest them.  
  And whereas Law must be consider’d in a two-fold Respect. 1.st As a Rule 
 of Action. 2. dly As the art of procuring redress when this Rule is violated; the 
 study in each of them may be regulated by the foregoing method.  And the Books 
 so recommended will so carry on your Joint Work, that with this course so 
 finish’d, the student may pursue each Branch of either, to its uttermost Extent, or 
 return to his Center of Knowledge without confusion, which is the only way of 
 rendering Things easily to the memory.~”37 
 
 Interestingly enough, Hale’s Advice to a Student and Reeve’s Direction to his 
Nephew were two of the sources recommended by Jeremiah Gridley to John Adams in 
                                                 
35 Hale’s Preface, n. p. [page 8]. 
36 Law Commonplace, Quincy n.p., Transcription p. [7]. 
37 Id., n.p., Transcription p. [9].  Quincy followed Reeve’s advice and relied on Wood’s Institute of the 
Laws of England for his preliminary “heads + divisions.”  As J. L. Barton observed of Wood’s Institute, 
“Its success was certainly due in part to the fact that it was the only book of its kind in print until 
Blackstone’s Commentaries was published, but it is only fair to say that the tenth edition appeared as late as 
1772, when the Commentaries had been in circulation for some years.”  J. L. Barton, “Legal Studies” in 
The History of the University of Oxford (ed. T. H. Ashton), vol. 5, The Eighteenth Century (eds. L. S. 
Sutherland, L. C. Mitchell, Oxford, 1986), p. 600.   
 The first volume of Blackstone’s Commentaries did not appear until 1765, and there is no mention 
of it in Quincy’s Law Commonplace.  There is a reference to Blackstone’s more rudimentary Analysis of 
the Laws of England [with] Introductory discourse on the Study of the Law (Oxford, 1756) and just 
preceding Reeve’s Directions to his Nephew, at Law Commonplace, Quincy n.p., Transcription, p. [6], but 
Quincy made little use of it, apparently preferring Wood’s “divisions” and Hale’s system.  See further 
citations to Blackstone’s Analysis at p. n.p. [10] and p. 89 [77] of the Law Commonplace.  John Adams was 
also aware of Blackstone’s Analysis, observing: “This day I am beginning my Ld. Hales History of the 
Common Law, a Book borrowed of Mr. Otis, and read once already, Analysis and all, with great 
Satisfaction.  I wish I had Mr. Blackstone’s Analysis that I might compare, and see what Improvements he 
has made upon Hale’s.” Adam’s Diary, vol. 1, p. 169. 
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1758, five years before, along with Dr. Dickins’ “Method of Studying the Civil Law.”38  
John Adams also met in 1758 with Oxenbridge Thacher, who, as noted above, would 
become Quincy’s pupil master.  Thacher also emphasized commonplacing, stating that he 
was “sorry that he neglected to keep a Common Place Book when he began to study Law, 
and he is half a mind to begin now.”39 
 
 This was no casual, haphazard course of study.  The university lectures of 
Blackstone, to be followed by Wilson, Kent and many others, doubtless were an easier 
path to legal theory, and Tapping Reeve’s lectures at Litchfield and Story’s “text-and-
recitation” system at Harvard may have been better structured professional training, but 
commonplacing had its own virtues as a way to learn.  You had to discover the structure 
of the law for yourself.  The analogy with the “rite of passage” of having to study Coke 
on Littleton, remarked on by both Adams and Story, who “wept bitterly,” is apt,40 as is 
the comparison with the student effort required by Langdell’s casebook and the Socratic 
method.41  “No gain without pain” was the informal creed of Langdell and his disciple, 
James Barr Ames, who rejected the predigested pedagogy of the lecture and the 
Continental treatise.  Commonplacing was an antecedent of the agonies of the case 
method, and it had similar virtues. 
 
 These virtues were appreciated by those that suffered through the commonplacing 
process, even as they developed easier, if not better, methods.  Take Joseph Story as an 
example.  Story’s “text-and-recitation” system, coupled with his own treatises, certainly 
rescued the Harvard Law School from near disaster in 1829.42  His vision of a university 
professional school has now become the model of modern legal education.43  But he 
certainly appreciated the value of what Quincy was doing in the Law Commonplace.  
According to Story: 
 
 “The early professors of the common law were compelled to resort to common-
 place books, and personal reports of cases, falling under their own observation.  
 Many manuscripts of this description are still extant, exhibiting a patient industry, 
 care, and accuracy, worthy of all praise.  The labor, indeed, of these venerable 
 jurists almost transcends the belief of students of the present day.  They noted 
                                                 
38 Adam’s Diary, supra, vol. 1, p. 54-55 (October 5, 1758). 
39 Id., p. 55. 
40 See Charles Warren, A History of the American Bar (Boston, 1911), pp. 175-176. 
41 Langdell’s pioneering casebook on contracts contains not one word of explanatory text.  To Langdell, the 
essence of study was to “select, classify and arrange all cases which had contributed to the growth, 
development, or establishment of any of its [contracts] essential doctrines.”  C.C. Langdell, A Selection of 
Cases on the Law of Contracts (Boston, 1871), p. VII.  In a sense, Langdell assisted with one aspect of 
commonplacing, the arrangement and sequence of cases, but continued to leave the student with the task of 
analysis and application.  As Langdell noted: “Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles 
or doctrines.  To have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility and 
certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer; and hence to acquire 
that mastery should be the business of every earnest student of law.” Id., p. VI. 
42 See Sutherland, pp. 92-139; Warren, History of Harvard Law School (New York, 1908), vol. 1, pp. 413-
506. 
43 See Daniel R. Coquillette, “ ‘Mourning Venice and Genoa’: Joseph Story, Legal Education and the Lex 
Mercatoria,” Lex Mercatoria (V. Piergiovanni ed., Berlin, 2005) (hereafter, “Coquillette, Joseph Story”). 
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 every case, in all its points and principles.  They abstracted from records, and 
 general treatises, and private manuscripts, often obscure and crabbed, everything, 
 that could be found to aid them in study, or in practice.  They gathered 
 voluminous collections of special pleadings, and unusual writs and judgments, to 
 suit the exigencies of their possible avocations; and thought no labor too great, 
 which brought any solid addition to their knowledge, or any increased facilities to 
 their clients.”44 
 
This appreciation reflected Story’s own training.  Story’s pupil master was Samuel 
Sewall.  Sewall rejected the “catch as catch can” apprenticeship, “mechanically 
obtained,” in favor of examining “the theory and General doctrines and the origins of the 
Municipal Law [i.e. national law], and descending from generals to particulars, to 
discover afterwards the partial applications and limits of the system.”45  For structure, 
Sewall could offer Story something Quincy never had, Blackstone’s Commentaries.  As 
R. Kent Newmyer has observed, Blackstone was “the primer,” and Story found it easy 
and “most elegant.”46  But Sewall soon directed Story to harder stuff, Coke on Littleton 
and the other classic English treatises.  In Story’s words, these were filled with “dry and 
technical principles, the dark and mysterious elements of the feudal system, the subtle 
refinements and intricacies of the middle ages of the common law…”.47     
  
 In addition, Sewall required Story to go beyond the treatises, and to read the 
American reports (there were but a few, and none published for Massachusetts in 1801) 
as well as many of the same English reports that Quincy digested, including the 13 
volumes of Coke’s Reports (published in installments between 1600 and 1659), 
Plowden’s Commentaries on Reports (published in Law French in 1571 and translated in 
1761) and Saunder’s Reports (published in Law French in 1686 and translated in 1722).  
By his own account, Story plunged into these reporters and many others, reading them in 
conjunction with treatises like Hawkins’ Pleas of the Crown (1716-1721), all at Sewall’s 
direction.48  As Story’s biographer, Newmyer, has acutely observed, this was a process of 
integration of knowledge into a structure.  Blackstone helped.  “[I]t would give Story, as 
it gave others, the tools of legal language, a compendium of guiding principles, an 
introduction to English legal history, and a vision of law as a science – that is to say, as a 
system of interrelated principles and rules.”49  But it was just the beginning.  The law 
reports, current American practices, and the technicalities of common law pleading had to 
be mastered too. 
                                                 
44 The Miscellaneous Writings of Joseph Story (ed. W.W. Story, Boston, 1852), pp. 380-381. 
45 Newmyer, p. 40.  
46 Id., p. 40. 
47 Id., p. 40. 
48 Id., pp. 41-42.  For an account of the sparse early American law reporting, see Erwin C. Surrency, “Law 
Reports in the United States” 25 Am. J. Legal Hist. 58 (1981); Alan V. Briceland, “Ephraim Kirby: Pioneer 
of American Law Reporting,” 16 Am. J. Legal Hist. (1972).  There is an excellent book about early 
Supreme Court reports, Morris L. Cohen & Sharon Hamby O’Connor, A Guide to the Early Reports of the 
United States (1995).  See also W. Hamilton Bryson, “Virginia Manuscript Law Reports,” 82 Law Libr. 
Jour. 305-311 (1990) and my case for Josiah Quincy’s claim as the first true American law reporter, Daniel 
R. Coquillette, “First Flower – The Earliest American Law Reports and the Extraordinary Josiah Quincy, 
Jr. (1744-1775),” 30 Suffolk Univ. L. Rev. 1, 1-15. 
49 Newmyer, p. 41. 
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 The vehicle Story used for the integration was commonplacing.  As Newmyer 
observed, “The working lawyer’s key to survival, if not success was his form or 
commonplace book….wherein practicing lawyers mobilized English precedent under the 
main header of law with a running count of leading American cases…”50  Story’s 
commonplace was prepared at Sewall’s direction but, it appears, despite Sewall’s 
promises to “assist you in arranging your learning,” it was Story’s own work.  Story saw 
this effort and struggle as essential to mastering law, “I felt that I breathed a purer 
air…and that I had acquired a new power.”51 
 
 Story’s law training was the training of a future Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court and the savior of Harvard Law School.  Note how close it was to that of 
Quincy!  Although Story’s apprenticeship ended in 1801, more than thirty-five years after 
Quincy’s Law Commonplace, the basic ingredients were the same.  Of course, Story had 
Blackstone. Initially, lacking Blackstone, Quincy had to turn to Matthew Hale’s 
Introduction to Rolle’s Abridgment (1668), Thomas Wood’s An Institute of the Law’s of 
England (1720), and Charles Viner’s General Abridgment of the Law and Equity (23 
vols., 1741-1753) for structured categories.  In addition, by 1801 Story had a few 
American reports to integrate with the English reporters.  Quincy had to create his own.  
But the process, and the struggle, was the same.  At its best, it was a pedagogy that 
created good, even great, lawyers.  As Newmyer observed: 
 
 “If a good education is one that equips its recipient to do what has to be done, 
 Story’s Law – office education was an excellent one.  He learned the theory and 
 was at home in the practical application of it.  He was ready to do business.  But     
            he learned more, too.  The three years of apprenticeship had left him with a deep 
 love of the law and a lasting admiration of legal science.”52 
 
The same was true of Quincy.  How many of our law students could say the same today? 
 
  
II. THE DOCTRINES AND THE SOCIETY 
 
 Quincy’s Law Commonplace can teach us a lot about colonial legal education, but 
it is also a treasure house of information about what the law was, and how people lived.  
In a commonplace book, the last two really are inseparable.  Books like Wood’s An 
Institute of the Laws of England (1720) or Blackstone’s Commentaries (1765-1769) 
could, and often did, exist in a theoretical test tube, far removed from what Langdell 
called “the ever-tangled skein of human affairs.”53  But the purpose of commonplacing 
was to apply doctrine to that “ever-tangled skein,” in actual practice.  Again, Quincy’s 
Law Commonplace was not a defined, closed, formal, system of learning, but was 
                                                 
50 Newmyer, p. 42. 
51 Newmyer, p. 41. 
52 Id., p. 44. 
53 C.C. Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts (Boston, 1871), p. vi. 
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designed to be constantly updated through the Legis Miscellanea sections, as Quincy 
gained experience.54 
 
 Both the initial “index” of Quincy’s Law Commonplace and the retroactive index 
of the Legis Miscellanea indicate what was considered important in practice.  But this is 
particularly true of the Legis Miscellanea index, because it shows what was “added” on 
as Quincy studied and observed his pupil master and court cases.  The former index is 
like the “suggested curriculum” of today’s law schools.  The Legis Miscellanea is more 
like the little notebook I kept when I first practiced law.  It did not reflect what my law 
teachers thought was important, but rather what I learned in the “school of hard knocks,” 
day by day, at my Boston law firm.  A lot of my notebook was about my clients and their 
needs, rather than just legal rules and doctrines, and that is certainly true of Quincy’s Law 
Commonplace.  This is where society meets doctrine. 
 
 Here is an example from the “Case Note Section” of the Law Commonplace, also 
cross-referenced to Quincy’s “Law file C.” 
 
   “W[h]ether, a negro woman being with child complains to 
   a Just Pacis [Justice of the Peace] of a free White Man being the father, 
   can the Justice upon such Complt [Complaint] issue his 
   Warrant agt the Man + recognize him to appear 
   before the Sessions as provided by the Prov. Law 
   p. 10. 11 in Case of a White Woman gotten with 
   Child.  This Question answer’d in the Negative. 
   + the reasons Why.  vid. Law-file C.” 
 
      Law Commonplace, p. 106 [91]. 
 
Colonial welfare law depended on taking responsibility for your children, and justices of 
the peace had a general power to issue warrants to question witnesses.  See Province 
Laws (Geo. II anno. 17, 1744) Chap. 222, The Charter and General Laws of the 
Colony…of Massachusetts Bay (Boston, 1814), p. 551-552 (hereafter, “General Laws”).  
See also Douglas Lamar Jones, “The Transformation of the Law of Poverty in 
Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts,” Law in Colonial Massachusetts (D.R. Coquillette, 
R.J. Brink, C.S. Menard, eds., Boston, 1984), pp. 153-190.  (Hereafter, “Jones, Law of 
Poverty”).  At almost exactly the time Quincy made this notation, there was a well-
documented case in 1765 of an Amos Jewett, Jr. being found liable for five shillings per 
                                                 
54 Matthew Hale talked of a seven year period, or longer, for the commonplacing process.  “Touching the 
method of the study of the Common Law, I must in general say thus much to the student thereof; It is 
necessary for him to observe a Method in his Reading and Study; for let him assure himself, though his 
memory never be so good, he shall never be able to carry on a distinct serviceable Memory of all, or the 
greatest part he reads, the the end of seven years, nor a much shorter time, without the help of Use or 
Method; year what he hath read seven years since, will, without the help of Method, or reiterated use, be as 
new to him as if he had scarce ever read it: a Method therefore is necessary, but various, according to every 
Man’s particular Fancy…” Matthew Hale, “Preface Directed to the Young Students of the Common Law,” 
in Henry Rolle, Un Abridgment Des Plusieurs Cases…Del Common Ley (London, 1668), n.p. 
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week to support two bastard children, twin boys, by one Sarah Moor of Rowley.  Id., p. 
162, see Rowley Sarah Moor, File Papers, 1767, Essex Sessions.  In 1767, Jewett was 
sent to debtors’ prison because he could not keep up the payments.  This was a serious 
concern to the selectmen of Rowley, who would otherwise have to “absorb the costs of 
raising Sarah’s children.” Id., p. 163. 
 
 So the usual legal doctrine was one of responsibility, backed by a powerful social 
policy of enforcement, to keep the cost from falling on the relevant town or city.  Justices 
of the peace had statutory power to hear such complaints and subpoena witnesses.  Why 
not here? 
 
 Quite obviously, Quincy’s notation tells us as much about race and gender politics 
in 1763 as it tells us about a rule of law.  We would like to see “the reason why” in 
Quincy’s last “Law file C,” but it is quite clear that accusations by a black woman against 
a white man would not be allowed, despite strong policy reasons to establish paternity.  
Perhaps the relevant town could bring the complaint instead, but this case is more than a 
legal doctrine, it is a window into colonial racial politics. 
 
 There are many such windows in the Law Commonplace.  Here are just a few 
examples, taken from three of Quincy’s most “Active” alphabetical categories, “Baron + 
Feme” (husband and wife), “Apprentices and Servants,” and “Jury.”  Each of these 
categories contains a number of legal rules and doctrines, but also graphically illustrates 
the “real world” of colonial society in which these laws existed and operated. 
 
 In Quincy’s Massachusetts social reality and legal doctrine were closely linked.  
This was because of the state of the legal system and public attitudes toward legal 
authority.  These attitudes can be particularly well understood by studying the Law 
Commonplace together with Quincy’s manuscript Law Reports, against which the Law 
Commonplace was cross-referenced.  Most colonial judges were laymen, who rarely gave 
reasons for their decisions.  In addition, these decisions, as in England, were usually 
given orally from the bench.  Quincy’s Reports, therefore, consist mainly of reciting the 
facts of the case, the arguments of counsel, and the base vote of the judges at the end – 
although the judges often asked questions and made remarks that reveal the reasons for 
their vote.55  Many of these cases demonstrated a strong social pragmatism, in both the 
rationales of the arguments and the judicial comments. 
 
 This pragmatism was supported by ambiguity as to the source of law and legal 
authority.  Massachusetts was subject to what my colleague Mary Sarah Bilder calls “the 
transatlantic constitution.”56  Under the charter of 1691, the colony could make laws “not 
repugnant or contrary to the laws of this our realm of England.”57  There was also a 
                                                 
55 See Daniel R. Coquillette, “First Flower – The Earliest American Law Reports and the Extraordinary 
Josiah Quincy, Jr. (1744-1775),” 30 Suffolk Univ. L. Rev. 1, 1-15 (hereafter, “Coquillette, Law Reports”). 
56 See Mary Sarah Bilder, The Transatlantic Constitution: Colonial Legal Culture and the Empire 
(Cambridge, MA, 2004), pp. 1-11. (Hereafter, “Bilder”). 
57 The Charters and General Laws of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts Bay (Boston, 1814), The 
Charter of the Province…(1691), pp. 31-33.  (Hereafter, “Charters and General Laws”).  It is interesting to 
note that oaths had to be “not repugnant to the laws and statutes of this our realm of England.” Id., p. 33 
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strictly limited appeal to the privy council in London in civil actions “wherein the matter 
in difference doth exceed the value of three hundred pounds.”58  This was a large sum of 
money, and, in practice, leave to appeal was granted with great reluctance.59 
 
 There were no published colonial law reports.  Colonial statutes often did not 
pertain to key areas of legal dispute and, even then, could be ambiguous and badly 
drafted.  Thus, the courts had quite a bit of discretion.  The real issue was how closely 
they were required to follow English common law doctrines, as set out in the English 
texts and reports available in the colony.  After Coke’s famous decision in Calvin’s Case 
(1608), it was clear that English law “was not automatically received in conquered 
territories” and, thus, arguably not in the American colonies.60  In addition, English 
authorities were often not cited in oral argument, particularly in less lucrative cases.  In 
these “lesser” cases, the lawyers often took little time to prepare their legal authorities, 
sometimes to the annoyance of the judges — and Quincy.61  When English precedents 
were relied on, as in the major inheritance cases, they were often invoked by both sides, 
with a cavalier disregard for what the cases actually said, again to Quincy’s expressed 
irritation.62  Even in major cases, the final decision could depart markedly from English 
legal doctrine.  The justification given was sometimes local customs, or practical 
necessity, or social policy, or all three.  As we will see in the Introduction to Quincy’s 
Reports, infra, sometimes the judges gave no reasons at all, even for important 
departures.  The inherent assumption, infrequently voiced explicitly, was that such 
departures did not violate the “repugnance” provision of the Charter, an easy argument to 
make if the English Common law was uncertain or, as was often the case, poorly 
researched.  Appeals to the privy council were extremely scarce in Quincy’s Reports, and 
were clearly looked on with disfavor.63  Practical, social policy arguments, made in 
                                                                                                                                                 
(emphasis added).  Was the omission of “and statutes” from the general power to make law significant?  
Could colonial statutes conflict with individual English statutes, but not with the common law itself? 
58 Id., p. 32. 
59 See, for example, the discussion and the refusal to grant an appeal in Scollay v. Dunn (Case No. 30, 
1763, Reports, pp. 80-83. 
60 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge, Mass.), p. 17 
(hereafter, “Horwitz”).  See also Bilder, pp. 35-40. 
61 See, for example, Hanlon v. Thayer (Case 37, 1764), pp. 99-103, where Chief Justice Hutchinson 
remarked, “I should have been extremely glad if this case had been argued a little more largely by the 
Gentlemen of the Bar, and more Authorities cited, in Matter of so great Consequence.” Id., p. 102. 
62 See, for example, the discussion in the important case of Banister v. Henderson (Case 42, 1765) at pp. 
122-145.  At one point, Quincy questioned Gridley’s argument, noting, “Sed quaere, and see Dr. Sullivan’s 
Lect. On the Laws of England 182, 3 [published as F.S. Sullivan, Lectures on the Constitution and Laws of 
England etc. (London, 1770)], and Qu. If ye Act of Parliament extends, or is binding here.” Id., p. 145.  
(Quincy’s note must have been added after the case report).  In the same case, Chief Justice Hutchinson 
again admonished the bar “Have you no Authorities, Gentlemen?” to have Gridley reply “There is no 
Authority that the Sun shines.” Id., p. 122. 
63 Appeals “to his Majesty in Council” were not allowed in major cases such as Dudley v. Dudley (Case 9, 
1762), apparently because the Charter of 1691 allowed appeals in “personal” actions only and not land 
cases.  See Reports, p. 25, Charters and General Laws, supra, p. 32.  Cases that directly presented conflicts 
between English and colonial law, such as Bromfield v. Little (Case 40, 1764), Reports, p. 108, although of 
“much Importance to the Community,” were not appealed, possibly because the monetary requirement of 
the Charter was not met.  See also the discussion in Scollay v. Dunn (Case No. 30, 1763), where leave to 
appeal was denied.  Reports, pp. 80-83. 
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argument by counsel, were sometimes reinforced by ad hoc judicial comments, picked up 
by Quincy, and often seen to explain the decision itself.64 
 
 Scholars like Morton Horwitz have argued that “[t]he generation of Americans 
who made the American Revolution had little difficulty in conceiving of the common law 
as a known and determinate body of legal doctrine,” quoting Chief Justice Hutchinson’s 
remark, recorded by Quincy in 1767, that “laws should be established, else Judges and 
Juries must go according to their Reason, that is, their Will.” Reports, p. 234-35, “Charge 
to the Grand Jury,” 1767.65  Quincy himself, in his Southern Journal, criticizes the South 
Carolina bar for ignorance of the law, pointing out that it meant that the courts were free 
to do whatever they wanted.66  But the remarks of Hutchinson and Quincy cut both ways.  
Hutchinson was increasingly frustrated that juries, particularly the grand juries he 
charged, simply ignored what he regarded as “the law,” and Quincy pointed out the 
indifference of practicing lawyers and judges, in both the North and South, to common 
law doctrine, and the total ignorance in South Carolina of the common law forms of 
action.67  In this void, both lay judges, jurors and practitioners could be pragmatic and 
policy oriented.  Indeed, they had little choice.  Blackstone’s conception of a rigid 
judicial adherence to precedent and a clear distinction between legislation and judicial 
decisions required not only a “knowable” and determinate body of common law, but 
lawyers and judges that knew it.   
 
 As both his Law Commonplace and Reports demonstrated, Quincy wanted to 
know the law, and he knew a lot of it.  The start of the Law Commonplace in 1763 
predated the appearance of Blackstone’s first volume of his Commentaries in 1765.  
There is but one citation to Blackstone’s Commentaries, to the 1765 first volume, and 
only an occasional reference to Blackstone’s Analysis of the Law (1756).68  Quincy’s 
conception of the role of common law decisions, the jury, and statutes can neither be 
blamed on ignorance of the law nor on Blackstone.  Thus Quincy makes a particularly 
interesting test case for our theories about colonial jurisprudence. 
 
 It is Horwitz’s famous thesis that between “[t]he generations of Americans who 
made the American Revolution” and the world of the new Republic of 1820, a major 
change occurred, a “transformation of American law.”69 
 
 By 1820 the legal landscape in America bore only the faintest resemblance to 
 what existed forty years earlier.  While the words were often the same, the 
 structure of thought had dramatically changed and with it the theory of law.  Law 
                                                 
64 See, for example, Baker v. Frobisher (Case 2, 1761) on “unmerchantable soap” where the justices 
distinguished between ordinary retail sales and bulk sales sold “by sample.” Reports, p. 4. 
65 Horwitz, supra, p. 4. 
66 See Southern Journal (1773), p. 61, and accompanying notes, and its introduction, “An Odyssey of 
America on the Brink of Revolution,” supra. 
67 Id, p. 61, and accompanying notes. 
68 See the references to the Analysis at the beginning of the Law Commonplace, p. n.p., [6], p. n.p., [10], 
and at “Of Statutes or Acts,” id., p. 89 [77].  The sole reference to Blackstone’s Commentaries is at p. 94 
[82], and may be a later addition.  See note 37, supra. 
69 Horwitz, supra, p. 4 
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 was no longer conceived of as an eternal set of principles expressed in custom and 
 derived from natural law.  Nor was it regarded primarily as a body of rules 
 designed to achieve justice only in the individual case.  Instead, judges came to 
 think of the common law as equally responsible with legislation for governing 
 society and promoting socially desirable conduct.”70 
 
 
This “transformation”, in Horwitz’s view, was symbolized by a shift from a 
“Blackstonian” conception of the law, with a strict adherence to common law precedent 
by judges and a clear distinction between the role of a statute and a judicial decision, to 
something altogether different, where instrumental judicial legislation was candidly 
recognized.71 
 
 The Law Commonplace can hardly be an adequate test of this major theory.  
Quincy was just one colonial lawyer, and an atypical one at that – particularly bright, 
rich, and well-educated.  But he was very interested in the things that constitute the core 
of Horwitz’s theory, such as the nature and source of common law precedent, the role of 
jury in “achieving justice…in the individual case” and the function of statutes.  Let us 




A. DOCTRINES OF GENDER 
 
 As my distinguished colleague, Mary Sarah Bilder, observed:  “The laws of 
England preferred inheritance practices that were gendered (favoring the eldest son), 
lineal (favoring keeping land within bloodlines), and ancestral (favoring inherited 
land).”72  Thus the “pigeon holes” for gender in Quincy’s Law Commonplace will include 
“Estates, and Lands, Tenenments and Hereditaments”73 as well as the more obvious 
“Baron + Feme”74 [husband and wife] and “Marriage.”75  Also included should be 
“Powers,”76 which include the critical issues of what a married woman can do legally, 
and “Base Possession,”77 which include issues of whether a wife’s mere possession of 
goods or property is imputed to the husband. 
                                                 
70 Id., p. 30. 
71 Horwitz quotes the 1817 lectures of Tapping Reeve and James Gould at the Litchfield Law School: 
“Theoretical[ly] courts make no law, but in point of fact they are legislators.” Horwitz, p. 23.  Horwitz 
regarded Blackstone’s “dichotomy between the nature of the two forms of law” as “a fairly recent 
creation,” noting that Coke “in deciding Calvin’s Case in 1608 did not make the distinction.  “[T]here was 
no suggestion of a distinction between statute and common law, for statutes were still largely conceived of 
as an expression of customs.” Id., p. 17.  But, Horwitz argued, in the period “[b]efore the American 
Revolution common law and statute law were conceived of as two separate bodies of law, and the authority 
of judges and legislators was justified of law that they administered.” Id., p. 16-17. 
72 Bilder, supra, p. 91. 
73 See Law Commonplace, pp. 25 [30], 47 [45], 49 [47]. 
74 See Id., pp. 22 [27], 176 [119]. 
75 See Id., p. 179 [122]. 
76 See Id., p. 181 [124]. 
77See Id., p. 176 [119]. 
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 Massachusetts had early rejected the English doctrine of “primogeniture,” that 
intestate land descends solely to the eldest son.78  The “repugnancy” to English law 
clause of the 1689 Charter was carefully circumvented.79  “Partibility” [i.e. equal division 
to each child] or “coparcenage” the usual English doctrine when a testator had only 
daughters, was imposed by statute.80  The major issues arose when the “partibility” 
doctrine was circumvented by will, usually by attempting an “entail male,” i.e., descent 
by male blood heir only, or reversion to testator’s direct heirs.81  The Superior Court of 
Judicature felt constrained to accept such gendered restrictions, but only if the will was 
legally correct.  Ambiguities were resolved for partibility, a distinct difference from 
English law.82   
 
 Quincy’s Law Commonplace emphasized two important distinctions.  Land 
brought into a marriage by the wife may be in control of the husband during the wife’s 
life, but on her death is certainly treated differently from lands brought to the marriage by 
the husband.  “But where lands do descend from the part of the mother, the Heirs on the 
part of the father never inherit so on the contrary.  Observe then the difference where the 
son purchaseth lands in Fee-s[imple] + where he comes by them by descent, on the part 
of the mother, or of the father.”83  In addition, bias against female gender was trumped by 
the bias toward blood lines.  “A sister of the whole blood shall be preferred before the 
younger of Brother of the Half Blood.”84  Absent, however, from the Law Commonplace 
were the struggles over male entail so carefully chronicled in Quincy’s Reports.85   
 
 More prominent in the Law Commonplace was the legal subordination of a 
married woman.  In fact, “Baron & Feme” (“Husband and Wife”) constitutes the largest 
section of the “core” commonplace, not counting related sections, like “Marriage” in the 
Legis Miscellanea.86  Quincy’s world was one of social, racial and gender hierarchies, 
                                                 
78 Quincy’s Law Commonplace made no mention of the Massachusetts provincial statute William & Mary 
4 (1692) “An Act for the Settlement and Distribution of the Estate of Intestate,” Charters and General 
Laws (Boston, 1814), Chapter 8, p. 230-232, which established partibility in the colony, rather than 
primogeniture!  See, in contrast, Quincy’s Reports, Dudley v. Dudley (Case 9, 1761), p. 12; Elwell v. 
Pierson (Case 20, 1762), p. 42; Baker v. Mattocks (Case 29, 1763), p. 69; and Banister v. Henderson (Case 
42, 1765), p. 119. 
79 See Law Commonplace, pp. 47 [45]-49 [47]. 
80 See William & Mary 4 (1692), Charters and General Laws, supra, pp. 230-232. 
81 See cases cited at note 102 , supra. 
82 Unlike his Reports, Quincy’s Law Commonplace simply copied in the traditional English law under the 
“Of Lands, Tenements + Hereditaments” caption, taking it mostly from Thomas Wood’s An Institute of the 
Laws of England (1st ed., London, 1720), book 2, chap. 3, pp. 228-230.  See Law Commonplace, page [7], 
note 3, infra.  Thus he writes: “In short, Lands + Tenements in Fee-s: Descend, 1st to the eldest son or Heir 
+ to his issue: The sons first in order of birth + for want of sons to all the Daughters equally,” although that 
was not the law in Massachusetts.  The section “Of Estates” in the Legis Miscellanea also simply 
reproduces English common law, but focuses instead on the more difficult Coke on Littleton (London, 
1628) and William Hawkins Abridgment of Coke on Littleton (London, 1711).  See vol. 4, pp. 5-10, infra, 
and accompanying notes, and pages [24], n. 9, [68], n. 6. 
83 Law Commonplace, p. 48 [46]. 
84 Id., p. 48 [46]. 
85 See note 102, supra. 
86 Law Commonplace, Index “Legis Miscellanea,” p. 179 [122]. 
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and it is not surprising that a law student would organize the law in this way.  Indeed, 
modern critical jurists and legal realists would see such a structure as more “honest” or 
natural than the doctrinal formalism of Langdell and the “categories” of legal education 
that have persisted to this day.87   
 
 In theory, the marital subordination of women “cut both ways”; married women 
had clear privileges and rights based on their status, as did married men.  Sometimes the 
disabilities are mutual.  Evidentiary privilege is one example of a mutual disability, duly 
noted by Quincy.  “Baron + feme cannot be witnesses for or ag.t each other,” with the 
exception of high treason and “3 H.7 Chap.2”88  The latter statutory exception was also 
carefully noted by Quincy, “where the wife may be evidence against her husband forcibly 
taking her away and marrying her,” tracking the 1488 statute of Henry VII which 
established penalties for “carrying a woman against her will, that hath lands or goods.”89  
Thus while evidentiary disabilities are, in theory, mutual, the “force” exception shows 
that in practice it might particularly harm women.  In any event, if so much depended 
legally on marriage, a forced marriage was reprehensible. 
 
 Again, in theory, the feme “covert,” the married woman, could not contract, could 
not appear in court, and could not have seisin of land except through her husband.  “The 
wife is so much under the power of her husband, that she is disabled to contract with any 
person without his consent…”90  But Quincy added some key, underscored words, 
“without his consent, precedent or subsequent, express or pre-sum’d.”91  Here we have 
another window into the reality of the colonial world.  Despite his English sources, 
Quincy observed: 
 
  “She [the married woman] cannot bind her H [husband] in Strictness 
  for Necessaries by any contract, unless a precedent or 
  Subsequent assent is proved or presumed; But usually 
  her Contracts are allowed, if She buys goods for 
  herself, Children, or family, as Bread +c. or for her own 
  necessary Apparel.  The H is bound to maintain his 
  W [wife] in Necessaries, + therefore if Goods come to H's Use 
  it is Evid. to prove his Assent, but not binding 
  Evid; for it may be contradicted by Other Proof 
  as that He gave his Wife ready money; Admitting 
  then that the H sh.d be charged in strict 
  -ness for necessaries; tho' he knows nothing of 
  them; [yet if]1 he forbids particular Persons to 
                                                 
87 See, for example, Duncan Kennedy’s “How the Law School Fails,” 1 Yale Rev. of Law and Social Action 
71 (1970), Mark Tushnet, “Critical Legal Studies: A Political History” 100 Yale L.J. 1515 (1991), and the 
discussion in Laura Kalman, “The Dark Ages,” in History of the Yale Law School (A.T. Kronman, ed., 
New Haven, 2004), pp. 203-206. 
88 Law Commonplace, p. 20 [25]. 
89 See Law Commonplace, p. 20 [25], note 4.  See also Ferdinand Pulton, A Collection of Sundrie Statutes, 
(London, 1632), p. 401. 
90 Law Commonplace, p. 20 [25]. 
91 Id., p. 20 [25]. 
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  trust his W, he shall not [be] charged after such Pro- 
   -hibition.”92   
 
So, as a practical matter, a colonial wife could engage in normal shopping, and trades-
people could enter into normal supply contracts with her, unless they had actual notice 
that there was no normally “pre-sum’d” consent from the husband.  Even general notice 
was not enough, according to Quincy.  “A prohibition in general not to trust a wife, as by 
putting her in the gazette, etc. cannot amount to legal notice.”93 
 
 The problem came when the wife engaged in a trade or business outside of 
household “necessities.”  There is evidence in both Quincy’s Reports and the Law 
Commonplace that this certainly occurred.  Such activities ranged from criminal activity, 
such as acting as a “fence” for stolen goods or running a “bawdy house,” to the practice 
of medicine.94   
 
  “A man 
  shall not be charged by the contract of his W, (ex- 
  -cept as above for necessaries) if he hath no 
  notice of it, tho' the things do come to his use. 
  Neither, shall a H be bound by his W's receipt 
  of his money.”95 
 
But actual practice was more complex.  In his Legis Miscellanea, Quincy emphasized an 
English case in which a woman was practicing medicine, Brashford v. Buckingham and 
his wife (1601), 2 Coke’s Reports (London, 1657), p. 77.96 
 
   “• Action brôt by Baron and Feme on a promise made to ye Feme 
   in consideration, she wd cure such a wound and alleges she did cure. 
   Adjudg’d good upon Writ of Error, in Exchequer Chamber because 
   the Action is grounded upon a promise made to ye feme + 
   upon a matter arising upon her Skill + a performance to 
   be made by her Person + such an Action wd survive to the 
   feme.    Cro. James 77 This case is [discussed?] at Barnardiston 75. 
   + [And] debt upon judgment in Trespass for 10/ Damages + 40/ 
   Cost, + the Statute pleaded.  Vide. 2. Vent. 36.”97 
 
Quincy also emphasized another English case where a woman was “carrying a trade in 
her own name as a widow,” and then sought to use “coverture” to escape her obligations. 
 
                                                 
92 Id., pp. 20 [25] – 21 [26]. 
93 Id., p. 21 [26]. 
94 See Id., p. 152 [95].  See also Quincy’s Reports, Dom. Rex v. Doaks (Case 34, 1763), p. 90 (bawdy 
house); Dom. Rex v. Pourkdorff (Case 38, 1764), p. 104 (theft). 
95 Law Commonplace, p. 21 [26]. 
96 Id., p. 152 [95], n.8, see also p. 16 [21]. 
97 Id., p. 152 [95]. 
 27
  “A woman whose husband has left her about 12 years before 
  had carried on trade in her own name as widow + given re 
  ceipts in her own name, being sued for debt contracted in 
  the course of her trade gave coverture in evidence + that 
  her H. had been lately in Ireland+ Holt directed the Jury 
  to find for Defn + so they did.  1. Bac. 308. 
  On N. A. Deft proved she had a H. alive in France 
  Jury found for plf.  On motion for a new trial as a verdict 
  against evidence it was denied for a divorce shall be in- 
  tended. 1. Salk. 117.”98 
 
Thus if a woman’s husband is dead, or if a divorce “shall be intended,” she would have 
the power to enter binding contracts, even entered into while married, as long as the 
people dealing with her believed they were doing business with the woman on her own 
account, a doctrine similar to the “sole trading” cases “according to the custom of 
the…City of London.”99   
 
 Quincy added a final English case relating to “separation by consent.” 
 
  “If B. + Feme separate by consent + she has a separate al- 
  lowance tis unreasonable she should have it in her 
  power to charge him + it is not to be presumed but 
  tradesmen trust her on her own credit + not the credit 
  of her H. + a personal notice is not necessary it is suf- 
  ficient that it be public + generally known. 
  Holt ruled a H. was liable to his wifes contracts, because they 
  cohabitated. 1. Salk. 113-Everyman is obliged to maintain his wife + 
  an action may be maintained against him for necessities provided  
  suitable to her rank in life”100 
 
While the selective mixture of English precedents in Quincy’s Law Commonplace can be no 
more than a suggestion as to the colonial law, the picture that emerges is fairly practical, 
given the overall gender bias of the law.  In theory a married woman had no legal 
personality, except to protect herself from being forced into marriage itself and, in Quincy’s 
words, “If the husband threaten his wife to beat or to kill her, she may make him find security 
for the peace.”101  But in practice, the legal obligation of the husband to provide 
“necessaries,” including “necessities provided suitable to her rank in life,” provided implied 
consent to most domestic transactions, absent actual notice.102  Where the woman was doing 
business on her own, she could use her husband’s legal personality, where appropriate, to 
                                                 
98 Id., p. 27 [32].  “N.A.” is for “non-assumpsit,” “she did not promise.”  This was the standard plea by way 
of traverse denying the existence of an express promise “or of matter of fact from which the promise 
alleged would be implied by law, and thus raised to general issue.”  Earl Jowitt, The Dictionary of English 
Law (ed. C. Walsh, London, 1959), p. 1231. 
99 Id., p. 27 [32], n.5. 
100 Id., p. 27 [32]. 
101 Id., p. 21 [26]. 
102 Id., p. 27 [32]. 
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appear in court or enforce deals.  Where death or separation made this impossible, Quincy’s 
precedents were sympathetic to enforcing the contracts as to the woman, so long as the other 
parties believed they were dealing with the woman in her own capacity or on her own credit. 
 
 The system gave the married woman three sources of security, besides simply 
not being beaten.  We have mentioned the husband’s duty to provide “necessities…suitable 
to her rank in life.”  The other two, which attach on the husband’s death, receive much 
attention in Quincy.  These are the right of the woman to “dower”, a one third life interest in 
her deceased husband’s estate, and, equally important, the return to her legal ownership of 
the real property she brought to the marriage.103  Of course, if the husband survived the wife, 
he had his own security in her property, “Curtesy of England,” which, assuming a child of 
the marriage had been born alive capable of inheriting the wife’s lands, gave the husband an 
estate in all of those lands for life.104  Dower was particularly important to women if efforts 
had been made to place lands in a male entail to the prejudice of a woman’s inheritance, a 
growing source of litigation in the colonies.105 
 
 Quincy’s notes also emphasized the effect of marriage on previously held 
debt. 
 
  “DEBTS of the WIFE dum sola. [i.e. “contracted while single”] If the W 
  before M [marriage] 
  was in Debt, the H + W must be sued for this Debt, 
  living the W.  But if the W dies, the H shall not be 
  charged for the debt of his W after her Death, if 
  the Creditors of the W do not get Judgmt during the 
  Coverture.  The H, as such is not chargeable in a Ct 
  of Equity, anymore than at Law, with the Debts of the 
  W after her Decease; not even tho' he had a large 
  Fortune with Her; as on the Other Hand he is, 
  during the Coverture liable to all her Debts, altho' 
  he did not get a shilling with her.”106  
     Citing Thomas Wood’s An Institute of the Laws 
     of England (London, 1700), vol. 1, c. 6, pp. 61-
     63, “effects and consequences of marriage.”  
     (notes deleted). 
 
While the husband would be fully chargeable with the wife’s debts while she was alive, he 
was not responsible on her death.  But the biggest trap was the other way around.  If a 
woman with “a large fortune” married an insolvent husband, all her property could be seized 
by his debtors, without her consent. 
 
                                                 
103 Id., p. 22 [27].  Where the property taken the form of personal chattel or “chases in action” (monetary 
legal claims), the result can be complicated!  See id., p.22 [27]. 
104 See David M. Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford, 1980), p. 327. 
105 See Bilder, supra, p. 96-97. 
106 Law Commonplace, p. 23 [28]. 
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 This appears to have been the subject of one of Quincy’s most interesting 
reported cases, Hanlon v. Thayer (Case 37, 1764), Reports, p. 99 (the so-called “naked wife” 
case).107  Mrs. Mary Hanlon, brought suit in trover108 through her husband, Mark, to recover 
“Apparell” attached by her husband’s creditors, altogether twenty-one entries of clothing and 
household goods.109  Mary Hanlon was a widow of a fairly wealthy merchant, John Salmon, 
and Mark was her second husband, “a mariner and a Yoeman.”110  The first issue in the case 
was whether it made any difference whether the clothes were brought into the marriage by 
Mary.  On this, the court had little trouble, Justices John Cushing and Peter Oliver observed 
that, although “the Case was very hard upon the Wife, who brought all these Cloaths at 
Marriage, yet ‘as they are personal Property, they become the Husband’s on Marriage, and 
therefore liable.’”111  The more interesting issue was whether there was an exception for 
“necessary” clothes.  There were two separate grounds for this exception: (1) the 
“necessities…suitable to her rank in life” exception to the ban on contractual powers and (2) 
the “necessary bedding utensils and implement of the household necessary for the upholding 
of life, to the use of the wife and family of the deceased” exception to the assets of an 
insolvent estate established by the 1710 Provincial Statute.112  See Charters and General 
Laws, supra, (Boston, 1814), Chap. 100 (Ann. 9, 1710), Sect. 2, p. 390. 
 
 Chief Justice Hutchinson observed that this was a “Matter of great 
Consequence,” and scolded the bar for failing to argue “more largely” with “more 
Authorities cited.”113  He continued: 
 
 “I always took it to have been the Custom in such Cases as this, for the Wife 
 to have her Cloaths; in Cases that have come before me as Judge of Probate I 
 never knew it denied to the Wife where the Estate was insolvent.  In the Case 
 cited [by Mr. Gridley] I suppose the Woman was a Party, and the Debt 
 contracted by her; this alters the Case much, but yet I apprehend (here Ch. 
 Just. Makes an Apology for what follows) that this may be one of those Cases 
 where the Justice says a Thing obiter, or suddenly; for one Gown can never be 
 supposed sufficient – must she go naked when that is washing?  Upon the 
 Whole I think  it would be very hard upon the Wife, should such a Precedent 
 as this take Place, that her Cloaths which she brought in Marriage must go to 
 discharge the Husband’s Debts.  I should think it safer to verge towards 
 Conveniency than to strain the Word Necessary.”114 
                                                 
107 See the full discussion in Coquillette, Law Reports, supra, pp. 23-25. 
108 Chief Justice Hutchinson observed that it would “have been better to have brought Detinne.”  Quincy’s 
Reports, p. 103.  He was right.  “Trover” was the correct action for wrongful deprivation of goods, where 
the remedy was “damages merely,” i.e. money.  See Earl Jowitt, The Dictionary of English Law (C. Walsh 
ed., London, 1959), p. 1785. (Hereafter, “Jowitt”).  “Detinue” was the correct action for “a plaintiff who 
seeks to recover goods in specie [i.e. the actual thing], or on failure thereof the value…” Id., p. 623.  
Assuming the plaintiff wanted her actual clothes back, she should have sued in detinue. 
109 See the excellent paper by Sally Ann Carter, Harvard Law School, Class of 1997, “An Exploration of 
Hanlon v. Thayer,” pp. 21-22, on file with the author. 
110 Id. 
111 Quincy’s Reports., p. 102. 
112 Id., p. 102, note 6.  
113 Id., p. 102. 
114 Id., pp. 102-103 (note omitted). 
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It remains unclear from the report if the other justices agreed, but Quincy noted that “the 
Jury found for the Defendant Costs.”115 
 
 Despite the hazards of marriage to a woman’s legal powers, it could be more 
dangerous to be unmarried.  In at least two Quincy cases women desperately sought to 
prove their marriages.  In the first, the defendant’s life depended on it, as she was charged 
with the murder of a bastard child.  Quincy began the report of Dom. Rex v. Mangent 
with the caption “Life and Death.”116  Under a 1696 Provincial Statute, the unmarried 
mother of a still born child without a witness was presumed a murder.117  Fortunately, it 
was decided that a marriage certificate from a minister “in another Government…without 
any authentication from any Magistrate” was acceptable.118  In the leading entail case of 
Banister v. Henderson, also reported by Quincy, the widow’s children were hard pressed 
to prove marriage in the absence of a certificate of marriage, despite the fact that their 
mother and father had lived together for many years as a married couple “both in Old and 
New England.”119  Once again the Chief Justice scolded the bar “for Want of 
Authorities,”120 and found for himself a passage in Thomas Wood’s A New Institute of 
the…Civil Law (first published, London, 1704) that “half Proof, ought to be extended in 
Favour of Marriage, rather than contrary to it.”121 
 
 Quincy’s Law Commonplace contained many more examples of “baron and 
feme” legal power issues, particularly in his “add on” section, “Legis Miscellanea 
Cursim,” indicating that these were common issues observed in practice and in his 
assigned legal reading.122  Strangely lacking, from the Law Commonplace, however, is 
any extensive discussion of the most pressing gender issue outside of marriage, male 
entails.  As emphasized before, a string of important cases in Quincy’s Reports show that 
the colonial bench and bar were deeply divided as to whether to encourage a construction 
of ambiguous or poorly drafted wills to lock land up in an eldest male only line, or to 
encourage “portablility” among male and female heirs equally.123  Except for a cursory 
mention of testator intent in the Legis Miscellanea, however, these issues were simply not 
dealt with by the Law Commonplace, emphasizing the importance of the later Reports as 





                                                 
115 Id., p. 103. 
116 Id., p. 163. 
117 Id., p. 162-163.  See “An Act to Prevent the Destroying and Murdering of Bastard Children,” Gul. III, 8 
(1696), Chap. 38, Charters and General Laws, supra, p. 293. 
118 Quincy’s Reports, p. 163. 
119 Id., p. 121. 
120 Id., p. 123. 
121 Id., p. 124. 
122 Law Commonplace, pp. 156 [99], 174 [117]. 
123 See discussion at note 102, supra. 
124 See Law Commonplace, “Legis Miscellanea,” p. 161 [104]. 
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B. DOCTRINES OF SERVITUDE 
 
 In addition to married women, Quincy’s Law Commonplace contains many other 
sections describing the legal rights of different types of people.  Some such categories are 
still familiar to us today, and Quincy’s notations in the Legis Miscellanea index covering 
“Infants, Ideots, + Madmen, etc.” seem familiar.125  Slavery was omitted from the Law 
Commonplace altogether.  Quincy’s Reports contain cases that make it clear that slaves 
had no legal personality in Quincy’s Massachusetts, and were regarded as chattel.126  
They were not just people with diminished legal rights, they were simply not considered 
people at all.  As discussed before, Quincy did note the different treatment of whites and 
free blacks, whose civil rights were curtailed by numerous provincial statutes.127  Also, 
“in the middle” were indentured “apprentices and servants.” 
 
 The importance of the “apprentice and servant” class to Quincy’s legal world was 
emphasized by long sections in the “core” Commonplace and by an important 1763 case 
in the Reports, Dunten v. Richards.128  Like marriage, apprenticeship was a two-way 
street, based on a legal undertaking whose terms were often implied by law.  Thus “[i]t is 
a reasonable cause of Departure from service if the servant is not allowed sufficient meat, 
Drink, etc. or if the master’s wife beats him.”129  Also like marriage, the apprentice loses 
much of his or her legal personality.  As Quincy noted, summarizing two English cases: 
 
  “A waterman's widow took an Apprentice, who went to 
  sea (being pressed into ye Queen's service) + earned 
  2 tickets [entitlements to accrued pay], wch came to ye dft's hands  
  [probably a money lender].  She bro't 
  trover for ye tickets, + had judgment; for what 
  ever an apprentice gains belongs to his master, 
  She may action for it.  1 Salk 68. Barber 
  v. Dennis.4  And if he be an appren[tice] only de 
  facto it is sufficient.  6 Mod. 64. cited 3 Vin: 
  23. notes q: v.5”130 
 
But, like the wife, the apprentice had rights to “necessities” and could not simply be 
“dumped”.  This was true of long term “servants” as well.  “If a servant retain’d for a 
                                                 
125 See Law Commonplace, p. 179 [122].  See also id., at pp. 155[98], 159[102], 165[108], 171 [114], 172 
[115]. 
126 See, for example, Quincy’s Reports, Allison v. Cockran (Case 36, 1764), p. 94 (“trover for a negro”) and 
Oliver v. Sale (Case 13, 1761), p. 29.  (suite for selling “two free Mulattos for Slaves”). 
127 Id., p. 106 [91].  See, for example, “An Act to Prevent Disorders in the Night” which prohibited an 
“Indian, negro or mulatto servant or slave” from being “abroad in the night time after nine o’clock unless it 
be upon some errand for their respective masters or owners.”  (October, 1703).  Charters and General 
Laws, supra, pp. 746-749.  “Fornication” between the races was prohibited and if “any negro or mulatto 
shall presume to smite or strike any person of the English, or other Christian nation, such negro or mulatto 
shall be severely whipped…” (October, 1705), id., p. 747-748. 
128 Case No. 28 (1763), Quincy’s Reports, p. 67. 
129 Law Commonplace, p. 15 [20]. 
130 Id., p. 15 [20]. 
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year falls sick, etc. the Master cannot put away his servant, or abate his wages.”131  And, 
to some extent, the master took over the servant’s legal personality as well, particularly 
when that servant was acting on the master’s business.  “If any servant is cozen’d of any 
money.  I may have an action against the Person that conzen’d him.”132 
 
 When doctrines of servitude and doctrines of marriage collided, it could get 
complex.  For example, if an apprentice married without the master’s consent, “the 
master cannot turn him away for that reason,” but the master could sue in covenant if the 
marriage violated the explicit apprenticeship agreement.133  What if a woman servant 
married and became a feme covert, can her husband break her servitude?  Or, suppose she 
becomes pregnant, in or out of marriage?  Quincy noted the following answers: 
 
  “If a Woman that is a Servant doth marry, yet she 
  must serve out her Time, + her Husband cannot take Her out 
  of her Master's service.  And if a Woman, being with Child 
  of a Bastard, procures Herself to be retain'd with a Master, 
  who knoweth nothing therof, or if She begotten with 
  Child during her Service, this is a reasonable Cause why 
  the Justices shd. dicharge her from her Service, for She hath 
   made herself incapable to serve any longer.”134   
 
 Apprenticeship was a special type of servitude because it was always based on a 
writing, and had to be terminated by a writing and a magistrate.  Quincy paraphrased the 
section of Dalton’s Countrey Justice (London, 1618, many editions before 1746). 
 
  “An apprentice cannot be sent out of England, 
  unless the Nature of his Service does require it. 
  As an apprentice cannot be made without Writing, 
  so He cannot be discharg'd by his Master without Writing 
  under his Hand, + with the Allowance of One Justice.”135 
 
In addition, an apprenticeship did not terminate on a master’s death, but became part of 
the assets of the estate, almost like a slave would. 
 
  “If any Master dies, the apprentice goes to the Exttor 
  or admttnor, to be maintained, if their be assets.  But the 
  Exttor he may bind Him over to Another Master for 
   the remaining Part of his Time.  Wood. B.1.c6. p 52.”136 
   [Thomas Wood, An Institute of the Laws of England (London,  
   1700), vol. 1, c.c., p. 52.] 
                                                 
131 Id., p. 15[20]. 
132 Id., p. 16 [21]. 
133 Id., p. 14 [19]. 
134 Id., p. 15 [20]. 
135 Id., p. 15 [20]. 
136 Id., p. 15 [20]. 
 33
 
 Henry Sumner Maine famously described the progress of modern law as from 
“status” (i.e. “where old law fixed a man’s social position irreversibly at his birth”) to 
“contract” (i.e. where “modern law allows him to create it for himself”).137  What Quincy 
would have thought of Maine’s ideas remains uncertain.  Despite obvious unfairness and 
adhesion, he would probably have regarded the apprenticeships and servitudes of his day 
as free contracts with mutual advantage – unlike slavery, which Quincy detested.138  His 
Law Commonplace looked to English law on all these things, and the sections selected 
emphasized this contractual nature.  But, like the law of marriage, this law gave little real 
protection to those in servitude, only a minimal security from beating and starvation.  
These “status” relationships represented a view of civil and legal rights that we, today, 




C. DOCTRINES OF LEGAL AUTHORITY AND POWER 
 
 Quincy’s organization of the Law Commonplace was inspired by others, but the 
captions and subdivisions were uniquely his own.  This was especially the case for the 
Legis Miscellanea retroactive index, which was literally created by his experience.  Thus, 
this structure tells us a good deal about Quincy’s legal world.  We have already seen how 
colonial hierarchies were reflected in this structure – particularly the relative legal powers 
of wives, apprentices, children and servants. 
 
 A second important set of subdivisions related to sources of legal authority: in 
particular, doctrines relating to the division of authority between British legislation, 
colonial legislation, the colonial judiciary, and the jury.  These topics, gathered under the 
captions “Jury,” “Of Laws” and “Statute + Acts” took up a great deal of space in the 
“core” Law Commonplace, 24 pages of the 71 page total!  Three Quincy pages, 44 to 46, 
transcript [42] to [44], were originally assigned to “Jury,” but the subject spilled over to 
page 50 to 52, [48]-[50], following “Lands, Tenements + Hereditaments,” and then again 
to pages 58 to 63 [55]-[59] following “Legacy,” a clear example of Quincy 
underestimating a subject! 
 
 1. Of Judges and Juries 
 
 Under “Jury,” Quincy tackled two central issues:  1) What was the proper division 
of authority between judge and jury and 2) How should the jury go about finding the 
facts?  This was done in the context of Quincy’s obvious belief in the jury’s importance.  
Quincy emphasized the power of the jury, invoking Hume.  “Hume calls, the Institutions 
of Juries, admirable in itself + the best calculated for the Preservation of Liberty + ye 
administration of Justice, that ever was devised by the wit of man.”139  “Nothing 
                                                 
137 Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law (1st American from 2d English ed., New York, 1864), pp. 295-296. 
(Maine used the male pronoun, ironically appropriate for 1864). 
138 See the Southern Journal (1773), infra, pp. 91-95, 109-110, 113-114. 
139 Law Commonplace, p. 44 [42]. 
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contributes more, than the institution of tryals by Jury, to the support of that equity + 
Liberty, for which the English Laws are justly celebrated.”140 
 
 But jurors are “lay gents,” and, according to Quincy, therefore cannot be 
presumed to know the law.  Quincy’s Commonplace walked a fine line here.  The chosen 
excerpts emphasized, on one hand, that “[M]atter of law shall never be put in the mouth 
of lay gents”141 and that “Tis ye property of ye Court, jus dicere [to speak the law].”142  
Even as to matters of pure fact, the court had some power.  “[I]f ye Court do believe that 
ye Jury have given their verdict agt evid: they may order a new Trial,” wrote Quincy, 
relying on Lilly’s Practical Register; or General Abridgment of the Law (London, 1719), 
vol. 2, p. 605.143  “[Y]e Court may direct ye Jury to find according to ye evidence.”144  
“Matter in LAW shall not be given in Evid: to ye Jury, but ye other may demur upon it, 
for Lay Gents can not discuss matter in Law as it seems there, but it is not expressly 
adjudged there…”145 
 
 While Quincy dutifully selected and copied out the above passages, it quickly 
became clear that the issues, in practice, were much more problematic.  Jurors had an 
obligation to go beyond “the naked fact only,”146 “plain Truth + fact + common sense, + 
not political convenience far-fetch’d inference, or ingenious innuendo, being the proper  
object…”147  Quincy goes on to quote one of his favorite books, Catharine Macaulay’s 
(1731-1791) The History of England from the Accession of James I to The Elevation of 
the House of Hanover (1st ed., 1763-1765, London)148 (Hereafter “Macaulay’s History”).  
“A privilege of the constitution of England..the jury [are]…judges of Law as well as 
fact…The Court cannot refuse a General Verdict if the Jury will take the Law upon 
themselves.”149  “The Jury may take the Law upon them if they will.”150 
 
 Quincy attempted to resolve this tension as best he could.  First, the jury, in the 
terms later invented by Hohfeld, might have the power, but not the right, to go beyond 
the evidence.  “[T]ho’ ye evidence given be conclusive, yet ye Jury may find against it, + 
hazard ye attaint if they please.”151  Quincy also noted a case of Chief Justice Strange.  
“[T]he question…being merely a Point of Law, the ch: Justice told the Jury, they must 
find for the Debt. which they were very unwilling to do + therefore to prevent this going 
                                                 
140 Id., p. 44 [42].  (Quincy was using “equity” in the sense of “fairness.”  Juries were not used in “equity” 
cases, in the legal sense, such as “equity” cases in Chancery.  See Earl Jowitt, supra, pp. 724-726. 
141 Law Commonplace, p. 58 [55]. 
142 Id., p. 58 [55]. 
143 Id., p. 50 [48]. 
144 Id., p. 51 [49] (Lilly again). 
145 Id., p. 52 [50]. 
146 Id., p. 46 [44] (emphasis in original). 
147 Id., p. 45 [43]. 
148 See id., p. 51 [49], n. 6.  A copy of Catharine Macaulay’s History was in Quincy’s estate at his death.  
See Quincy’s Reports, Appendix 9, item 230. 
149 Id., p. 51 [49] (emphasis in the original). 
150 Id., p. 44 [42]. 
151 Id., p. 52 [50].  See also p. 44 [42] as to attaint, already an archaic remedy in Quincy’s day.  See William 
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford, 1768), vol. 3, p. 404, pp. 389-393.  Attaint at 
English law was abolished by the Juries Act, 1825, S. 60.  See Jowitt, supra, 114. 
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contrary to his opinion…suffer’d a Nonsuit.”152  The threat of attaint and the remedy of 
new trial left the jury’s power intact, but, at least in theory, provided some check, 
although, as will be discussed later, attaint was obsolete by Quincy’s time. 
 
 Further, certain issues were clearly reserved for the judges.  “It is Province of the 
Justices to determine what the meaning of any word or sentence in an act of Parliament 
is.”153  In addition, “The Judges shall judge what is a reasonable Time…”154  More 
problematic was the question of erasure, or forgery, in a document. 
 
  “Of ancient Time if a Deed appear’d to be erased 
  or interlined in Places material, the Judges adjudged 
  upon their view; the Deed to be void: But of latter 
  Times, the Judges have left that to the Jurors to try 
  wether the rasing or interlining were before the 
 .  Delivery.”155   
 
 In tackling these serious problems, Quincy turned to authorities that demonstrated 
that he was still updating his Law Commonplace on important subjects as late as 1772.  
Quincy notes, “See the question – whether juries are Judges of Law as well as fact treated 
in a masterly manner by the authors of “Considerations on Criminal Law” (p. 128 of that 
work) Reviewed in the Monthly Review May 1772 page 471, 472 etc.” [H. Dagge, 
Considerations on Criminal Law (London, 1772) 3 vols.].  Then follows an extensive 
quotation from Sir John Maynard’s (1602-1690) argument in Skinner’s Case, as recorded 
by Anchitell Grey’s Debates of the House of Commons (1667-1694) (London, 1769) see 
page [56], note 3, infra.  This argument is copied in the Commonplace in a noticeably 
different script, but probably still Quincy. 
 
 Maynard’s argument challenged any judicial review of a jury judgment, except on 
matters of law, narrowly construed: 
 
  “Every judgment is established on two 
  things of which the judge must have a care, vizt the Verity of the 
  fact & what the law is upon such fact; ex facto jus oritur [“the law  
  becomes operative after the fact”] now by the 
  constitutions of the Law of England, the trial of the fact is in one 
  hand, & the determination of the Law by judges sworn.  The judge may 
  not try the fact, nor the juror the Law, but at their extreme peril: 
  for by the Common-Law, the jurors, if they give a false verdict, under 
  went the villanous judgment vizt to have their houses raised, lands 
  wasted, meadows plowed, woods felled, body imprisoned, & infamy 
  perpetual never to be credited more.”156 
                                                 
152 Law Commonplace, p. 44 [42]. 
153 Id., p. 44 [42]. 
154 Id., p. 44 [42]. 
155 Id., p. 45 [43]. 
156 Id., p. 60 [57]. 
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Maynard eloquently argued that this delicate balance be un-reviewed on appeal, except in the 
most blatant circumstances: 
 
  “But by this way of proceeding before your Lordships, all 
  these advantages are lost; for the trial of fact & of Law, the 
  office of the judge & juror, are confounded.  There is no chal- 
  lenge or exception that can be taken to any of the Lords 
  tho’ one or more of them be enemies, or friends or allies to 
  either party, or engaged by opinion or solicitation, or interest 
  in the cause, of all these together, or any other; for tho’ 
  a juror may be challenged, a Judge cannot.”157   
 
 Quincy’s Law Commonplace, of course, is just a collection of legal statements 
copied from largely English authorities.  While the selections were carefully made, they tell 
us more about colonial legal education than the actual state of the law – something that 
would be true of law student notes today!  Further, like my old notebook from my Boston 
legal practice, the Law Commonplace was designed to provide Quincy with convincing 
arguments on both sides of potential issues – the selection to depend on the client’s interests.  
My distinguished colleague, Adriaan Lanni, has emphasized to me that most surviving 
sources of ancient Athenian law consist of “court speeches,” arguing one side or the other.  
This leaves the actual “Rule” of law to be determined.158  Thus with Quincy’s Law 
Commonplace.  But, for reasons every practicing lawyer can appreciate, these sources define 
the orbit of the arguable law.  Further, Quincy’s Reports are evidence of the actual law of the 
colony, and show how Quincy, quite sensibly, combined “book learning” with direct 
observation.  The Reports frequently verified the impression left by the Law Commonplace. 
 
 This was certainly true with the controversies over jury trial.  No less than six 
cases in Quincy’s Reports involve jury trials. Four focus on the power of the jury, and two on 
conditions of jury service. 
 
 One of the issues emphasized in the Law Commonplace was whether 
alteration of a document was a question of law for the judge, or a question of fact for a jury.  
In Norwood v. Fairservice (Case No. 47, 1765), Reports, p. 189-193, the plaintiff produced 
an indenture for £13.68 per quarter rent, and the defendant produced the other half of the 
indenture for £13.68 per year, a big difference!  It was argued by Gridley and Fitch for the 
plaintiff that “it had always been the Custom of this Court” to determine the legal effect “in 
such Cases.”  Robert Auchmuty replied for the defense: 
 
 Mr. Auchmuty.  I take it, the Gentleman is too early in his Objection; for Fraud 
 or no Fraud shall be try’d by the Jury, and not by the Court.  It is a plain 
 Matter of Fact, of which the Jury are the sole Judges.  Besides, of what 
 Advantage will it be for the Court to determine this Matter?  The Jury, after 
                                                 
157 Id., p. 61 [58]. 
158 See Adriaan Lanni, “Verdict Most Just: The Modes of Classical Athenian Justice”, 16 Yale Journal of 
Law & the Humanities 227 (2004).   
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 all, will determine whether this Variance was made before, or since the 
 Execution of this Deed; and will give what Credit they please to it: so that for 
 this Court to pass their Judgment will avail Nothing.  Neither do I think the 
 Court have any Right to determine this Matter; for ‘twill be abridging the 
 Priviledges of the Subject, to settle a Point which wholly lies with the Jury to 
 determine.”159 
 
As the Commonplace indicated, it was a close question.  The justices split on the issue. 
 
 Just. Oliver  This properly belongs to the Jury.  I am for admitting it to go in. 
 
 Just. Cushing  The Jury is sole Judge of this; they must give what Credit they  
   please. 
 
 Just. Lynde  As the Practice of this Court has always been otherwise, I am for  
   viewing it. 
 
 Ch. Justice  I know the Custom has been otherwise, but, for my Part, I think ‘tis  
   Time it was altered – am for admitting it.160 
 
The counterpart of the Indenture ultimately went to the jury.161   
 
 An even tougher issue was presented by a case where the word “or” had been 
omitted on a note.  The note obliged the promisor “to pay Plaintiff Order” instead of “to 
pay Plaintiff or Order.”  Was this promissory note negotiable?  And was that a factual or 
legal issue?  Auchmuty argued that this was a question for the jury. 
 
 Mr. Auchmuty.  The Note is, to pay Plaintiff Order: The or is left out.  Where a  
 Note is nonsensical we are not obliged to follow it.  There can be no Doubt but 
 whether this is Evidence to a Jury or not.  In Favour of Justice doubtless it is.162 
 
The Court permitted the case to go to the jury, but on a different issue. 
 
 The Court ruled, that the Note should go in as Evidence, on another Point.*  That, 
 as the Note had not been indorsed, the Omission of Order was immaterial – 
 otherwise had it been indorsed. 
 
 Ch. Juft.  did not give his Opinion.163 
 
                                                 
159 Quincy’s Reports, pp. 189-190. 
160 Id., p. 191. 
161 Id., p. 193. 
162 Id., p. 118. 
163 Id., p. 118. 
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The Chief Justice’s attention was meaningful.  In Russell v. Oakes (Case 21, 1763, 
Reports, p. 49) it had been held, over his dissent, that there was no difference between a 
negotiable and un-negotiable note until it was endorsed.164   
 
 An even more fundamental issue, emphasized several times in the Law 
Commonplace, was whether a jury had the power to “give a verdict against the 
Evidence,” or whether the judge may grant a new trial to avoid injustice.  In  Angier v. 
Jackson (Case no. 31, 1763, Reports, p. 84), Auchmuty argued that there was no right to 
a new trial in that case because there was evidence to support the jury verdict, and 
observed that: 
 
 “The Court is not to be Judge of the Law and Fact too absolutely; if it should be, 
 it takes away all Verdicts but such as are agreeable to the Mind of the Court.  It 
 would be opening a Door to great Inconveniences to the Subject, even if Attaints 
 did not lie; but here Attaint lies.”165 
 
The Court was split again as to the scope of review, but decided against a new trial in this 
case. 
 
 Ch. Justice.  Are you not agreed that, were it evidently against Law and Evidence, 
 there the Court may grant a new Trial, but not where there is Evidence on both 
 Sides. 
 
 Trowbridge.  It can never be supposed that a Verdict will be given against direct 
 Evidence, without Shadow of Evidence to support it.  This differs from the Case 
 of Fuller & Clark at Cambridge – there was plainly Evidence against Evidence.  I 
 hold, this Court always have Right to grant new Trials when they think Injustice 
 like to be done. 
 
 Justices Oliver, Cushing, Russell & Lynde  against a new Trial, because the Court 
 were not clear in the former Trial.”166 
 
 Thus, the ambiguity in the Law Commonplace, which sets out arguments for and 
against a wide scope for jury power, accurately reflected the law of the colony.  By 1763, 
the only effective control over a jury was a new trial.  Despite Auchmuty’s argument, the 
deterrence of attaint had become obsolete by 1763.  See Samuel M. Quincy’s note 3, 
Reports, p. 85, and William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 3 
(1st ed., Oxford, 1768), pp. 389-393.  “[A]ttaint is now as obsolete as the trial by battle 
which it succeeded: and we shall probably see the revival of the one as soon as the 
revival of the other.” Id., p. 389.  Under these conditions, tensions over the power of the 
jury were inevitable, and important. 
 
                                                 
164 Id., p. 50. 
165 Id., p. 85.  Again, attaint was an archaic remedy by this time.  See note 175, supra. 
166 Id., p. 85. 
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 The power of the jury was certainly a centerpiece of both the Law Commonplace 
and the Reports, and Angier v. Jackson continues to be relevant to major modern 
constitutional cases about the scope of the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial and the 
“Reexamination Clause” of the Seventh Amendment.167  (“[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall 
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of 
the common law.”)  The “rules of the common law,” of course, must refer to those in 
effect in 1791, the date of the Seventh Amendment, and there are few American sources 
on this important issue as authoritative as Quincy.168 
 
 The Law Commonplace also focused on how the jury found facts. To begin, 
unlike a modern jury, the jury of Quincy’s day could rely on their own sources and 
knowledge.  This, of course, increased their power even more, because even if no 
evidence was presented in court, they could still bring in a verdict supported by evidence, 
their own knowledge.  Quincy noted, citing Plowden’s Commentaries (London, 1522), 
“The Jury may give their verdict without testimony, or against testimony, when they 
themselves have cognisance of ye fact.”169 
 
 But this could clearly lead to abuses.  First, Quincy noted that “If a Jury give a 
verdict on their own knowledge, they ought to tell ye Court so…”170  Why?  So that the 
lawyer on both sides have a chance to examine such knowledge “openly in Court.”171 
 
  “If any one of ye Jury, that is sworn to try ye issue, be 
  desired to give his testimony concerning some matter 
  of fact, that lies in his own knowledge, + concerns the 
  matter in Q:on [Question], as evid: to his fellow-jurors, ye Court 
  will have him examined openly in Court upon his 
  oath, touching his knowledge therein, + he is not to de- 
  liver his testimony in private to his fellow-jurors; 
  for ye Court + Council on both parts are to hear the 
  evidence given on either side as well as ye Jury, 
                                                 
167 The issue was recently revisited by the Supreme Court of the United States in Gasperini v. Center for 
Humanities, Inc., 518, U.S. 415 (1996).  This author, together with a group of legal scholars including 
Akhil Reed Amar, Erwin Chemerinsky, Arthur F. McEvoy, and Arthur R. Miller, filed an amicus brief 
supporting the power of the jury at common law.  The majority of the court were unconvinced, but a 
powerful dissent by Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, observed that 
“the court frankly abandons any pretense at faithfulness to the common law, suggesting that ‘the meaning’ 
of the Reexamination Clause was not ‘fixed at 1791,’ contrary to the view of all our prior discussions…” 
518 U.S. 415, at 461 (citation omitted).  See Daniel R. Coquillette, “First Flower:The Earliest American 
Law Reports and the Extraordinary Josiah Quincy, Jr. (1744-1775),” 30 Suffolk Univ. L. Rev. 1, 1-15 
(hereafter, “Coquillette, Law Reports”). 
168 See id., at pp. 12-15.  See also David L. Shapiro & Daniel R. Coquillette, “The Fetish of Jury Trial in 
Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 442, 228-55 (1971), cited with approval in 
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333, arguing 1791 as the appropriate date for assessing 
common law jury rights for Seventh Amendment purposes. 
169 Law Commonplace, p. 51 [49].  See id., p. 51 [49], note 8 on Plowden’s Commentaries. 
170 Law Commonplace, p. 50 [48]. 
171 Id.,p. 50 [48]. 
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  that it may be answered by ye other party, if need 
  require, + that ye Court may direct ye Jury to find 
   according to ye evidence.”172   
 
 Quincy’s Reports do not shed further light on the practical functioning of a jury, 
except for two cases indicating that jury service could be a hardship.  In Reed’s Case 
[Case No. 67, 1772] Reports, p. 331-332 a member of the standing Grand Jury for a 
county was exempted from service as a trial juror.  In The Petition of the Jurors in the 
Truth of Captain Preston and the British Soldiers (Case No. 71, 1771), Reports, pp. 382-
386, a “reasonable Allowance” for jurors who served in the Boston Massacre Cases, 
“said Preston’s Trial holding six Days, and said Soldiers nine Days, said Jurys being kept 




 2. Of Judges and Legislatures 
 
 Second only to Quincy’s focus on juries (10 pages), was his concern with the 
construction of legislation (9 pages).174  Of course, both could be constraints on judicial 
power, and both were highly controversial in Quincy’s world (as they still are in our 
world).  In addition to the inherent “turf” issues of division of power, there were also 
troubling questions of whether Parliamentary statutes should be given full effect in the 
colonies, and how to resolve apparent conflicts between colonial legislation and 
established English common law, particularly given the “repugnancy” clause of the 
Charter.175 
 
 To make matters even more subtle, Quincy linked his section “Of Statutes or 
Acts” to another 5 page section, “Of Laws.”  The latter section, relying extensively on 
Montesquieu’s L’Esprit des Lois (1748), looks at the “different orders of laws” in which 
domestic civil law is only one.  Montesquieu (1689-1755), based on his study of Locke 
and other English sources, developed an early theory of separation of powers, with 
separate roles for the legislature and the judiciary.  His “orders of laws” superficially 
resemble Roman law categories, but are more subtle and complex.  For example, the 
Roman “natural law,” jus naturale, was really a law of nature, like the rules of physics, 
while Montesquieu combined by “the law of God” of the neo-Thomists with the law of 
reason of the Enlightenment.  Quincy carefully extracted and copied these passages. 
 
  “The Laws of Nature derive yr force entirely from our 
  frame + being, + therefore so call’d. 
   The law wch by imprinting on our minds ye  
  idea of a creator inclines us to Him, is ye first in 
                                                 
172 Id., p. 51 [49], Relying on Lilly’s Abridgment (London, 1719).  See id., p. 50 [48], note 3. 
173 See Quincy’s Reports, supra, pp. 382-383, 385. 
174 See “Of Statutes or Acts,” Law Commonplace, pp. 89 [77] – 97 [85]. 
175 See Bilder, supra, pp. 2-7, 40-46, 55, 104-107. 
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  importance, tho’ not in order, of natural Laws. 
   Peace is ye first Law of Nature. 
  Another Law of Nature prompts to seek Nourishment. 
  The attraction arising from ye Difference of Sexes, + ye  
  natural inclination they have for each other, form 
  a third Law. 
   A fourth Law of Nature arises from the 
  Desire of living in Society.  Ib. ch: 2.”176 
  
Quincy also copied in excerpts from Jean Jacques Burlamaqui (1694-1748), professor of 
natural law at Geneva and another Enlightenment jurist.  His views of “natural law” were 
even more rationalist than Montesquieu. 
 
  “By natural Law we understand, a law that God imposes 
  on all men, + wch they are able to discover + know by the 
  sole light of Reason, + by attentively considering their 
  state + Nature. 
   Natural Law is likewise taken for the 
  system, assemblage, or Body of the Laws of Nature. 
   Burlamaqui’s Poin: Natl Law. p. 126.”177 
 
Theories of statutory construction and natural law were hardly “academic” in Quincy’s 
world.  The Stamp Act of 1765 brought all this issues to the fore, only two years after Quincy 
began the Law Commonplace.178  Quincy’s Reports contain the arguments concerning the 
Memorial of Boston of December 18, 1765, in which Enlightenment “natural law” arguments 
featured prominently.  As John Adams began: 
  
  “There are certain Principles fixed unalterably in Nature.  Convention and  
  Compact are the Requisites to make any Law obligatory.  That the Subject is 
  not bound by Acts, when he is not represented, is a found Maxim of the Law, 
  and not peculiar to the British Constitution, but a Maxim of the antient Roman 
  Law: “What concerns All shall be judged by All.”179 
 
James Otis, Jr., further argued: 
 
  “The Laws which forbid a Man to pursue his Right one way, ought to be  
  understood with this equitable Restriction, that one finds Judges to whom  
  he may apply.  When there are no Courts of Law to appeal to, it is then we  
  must have Recourse to the Law of Nature,” &c.  Hugo Grotius, de Jure B.  
                                                 
176 Law Commonplace, p. 64 [60].  Montesquieu also was extracted in Quincy’s Political Commonplace.  
See Quincy Papers, vol. 1, p. 109.  
177 Id., p. 65 [61]. 
178 John C. Miller, Origins of the American Revolution (Stanford, rev. printing, 1959), pp. 109-146. 
179 Quincy’s Reports, p. 201. 
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  & P. Lib. 1, C. 3 §2.  Lib. 2, C. 4 §9. C. 7 §2, n. 2.  C. 20 §2, p. 4 & 5,  
  with Mr. Barbeyrac’s Notes.   Code, Lib. 1, Tit. 9, De Jud. & Cal.”180 
 
 Montesquieu added at least two more “orders” of law to which colonists could 
appeal against the Stamp Act.  These were carefully recorded by Quincy in the Law 
Commonplace.  The first was based on the old Roman jus gentium, the “Law of Nations.”  
Quincy noted, citing to Thomas Hobbes’ (1588-1679), De Cive (1642). 
 
  “The Law of Nations, properly so called, + consider’d as a 
  law proceeding from a superior, is nothing else, but 
  the Law of Nature itself, not applied to men consider’d 
  simply as such; but to Nations or States.  Ibid. p. 195. 
  Says Hobbes very justly, is divided into the natural 
  Law of Man, + the natural Law of States; + the 
  latter is what we call the Law of Nations. 
           De Civi. Cap. 14 p. 4.”181 
 
The second “order” was unknown to Roman law.  Montesquieu divided the Roman “Law 
of Nations,” the “ius civile,” into two parts.  First there was the “Politic law,” the “Laws 
relative to ye Govenors + ye governed; + this we call Politic Law.”182  Then there was 
“another set of laws relating to the mutual communication of citizens; by which is 
understood ye Civil Law.”183 
 
 Both “the Law of Nations” and the “Politic Law” were invoked in the Stamp Act 
arguments of the Memorial of Boston.  James Otis, who Quincy reported “opened  with 
Tears,” appealed both to the “Law of Nations” and the fundamental “Politic Law” of the 
realm. 
 
 “My Brother Adams has entered so largely into the Validity of the 
Act, that I shall not enlarge on that Head.  Indeed, what has been observed is 
sufficient to convince the most illiterate Savage that the Parliament of England 
had no Regard to the very first Principles of their own Liberties. 
 
   Only the Preamble of that oppressive Act is enough to rouse the 
 Blood of every generous Briton – “We your Majesty’s Subjects, the Commons of 
 Great Britain, &c., do Give and Grant” – What? Their own Property? No!  The 
 Treasure, the Heart’s Blood of all your Majesty’s dutiful and affectionate British-
 American Subjects. 
 
   But the Time is far spent – I will not tire your Patience.  It was 
 once a  fundamental Maxim, that every Subject had the same Right to his Life, 
 Liberty, Property and the Law, that the King had to his Crown; and ‘tis yet, I 
                                                 
180 Id., p. 204. 
181 Law Commonplace, p. 65 [61]. 
182 Id., p. 64 [60]. 
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 venture to say, as much as a Crown is worth, to deny the Subject his Law, which 
 is his Birth-right.  ‘Tis a first Principle, “that Majesty should not only shine in 
 Arms, but be armed with the Laws.”  The Administration of Justice is necessary to 
 the very Existence of Governments.  Nothing can warrant the stopping the Courte 
 of Justice, but the impossibility of holding Courts, by Reason of War, Invasion, 
 Rebellion or Insurrections.* 1 Inft. 249, a & b.  This was Law at a Time when the 
 whole Island of Great Britain was divided into an infinite Number of petty 
 Baronies and Principalities; as Germany is, at this Day.  Insurrections then, and 
 even Invasions, put the whole Nation into such Confusion, that Justice could not 
 have her equal Course; especially as the Kings in antient Times frequently sat as 
 Judges.  But War has now become so much of a Science, and give so little 
 Disturbance to a Nation engaged, that no War, foreign or domestic, is a sufficient 
 Reason for shutting up the Courts.  But, if it were, we are not in such a State, but 
 far otherwise; the whole People being willing and demanding the full 
 Administration of Government. Vid. Bracton, 240.”184 
 
Otis concluded with an appeal to the Magna Carta (1215), the core of English “Politics 
Law.” 
 
 “The King is always presumed to be present in his Courts, holding out the Law to 
 his Subjects; and when he shuts his Courts, he unkings himself in the most 
 essential Point. 18 E. 3, ch. 1.  1 H. 4 20 E. 3, ch. 2  4 H 4. ch. 1.  Vattel, p. 20.  
 And Magna Charta, and the other Statutes are full, “That they will not defer, delay 
 or deny to any Man Justice or Right.”  “That is shall not be commanded Charta, it 
 is said we deny no Man Justice , we delay no Man Justice. 2 Inft. ch. 29, p. 56 
 (1).”185 
 
 All of this was present in Quincy’s Law Commonplace, “Of Laws”.  This cannot 
help but impress us today.  Look at the breadth of the selections, starting with 
Montesquieu, but extending to Burlamaqui, Vattel, Hobbes, Beccaria, and Bacon, giants 
of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment.  These were companions on Quincy’s book 
case!186 
 
 But Quincy’s evident familiarity with the technical side of statutory interpretation 
is also impressive.  This, too, is featured in both the Law Commonplace and his Reports.  
The section in the Law Commonplace, “Of Statutes or Acts,” was cross-referenced to “Of 
Laws,” as well as to Quincy’s Preface to the Law Commonplace and to excerpts to 
Richard Burn’s Ecclesiastical Law (London, 1760), set out in Quincy’s Notebook 4, at 
page 101.  (P347, Reel 4, QP58).  There was a heavy emphasis on the “four factors” 
enunciated by Edward Coke in Heydon’s Case (1584), 3 Coke’s Reports, p. 7a, at 7b. 
 
  “For the sure + true interpretation of all statutes 
                                                 
184 Quincy’s Reports, pp. 203-204. 
185 Id., pp. 205-206. 
186 See Law Commonplace, p. 63 [59], n. 2.  (Montesquieu); p. 65 [61], n.2., (Burlamaqui); p. 65 [61], n.4, 
(Hobbes), p. 65 [61], n.5, (Vattel) ; p. 67 [63], n.2, (Bacon) and (Beccaria) ; p. 67 [63], n.3. 
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  in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or 
  enlarging of the Com. Law,) four things are to be discern’d 
  + consider’d. 1. What was the Common Law before the 
  making of the Act.  2. What was the mischief + defect for 
  which the Common Law did not provide.  3. What 
  remedy the Parliament hath resolved + appointed to 
  cure the decease of the CommonWealth.  And 4. the 
  true reason + remedy.  3 Rep. 7. b.”187 
 
At least in his early career, Coke took a “contextualist” view of statutes and this, of 
course, gave common law judges a very decisive role to play, particularly as to the “true 
reason and remedy.”188 
 
 In addition, there was the common law doctrine of “Equity of the Statute.”  Here 
Quincy uncharacteristically relied on Blackstone’s Analysis of the Laws of England 
(Oxford, 1756).189 
 
   “To interpret a Law, we must inquire 
  after the will of the Maker: which may be collected 
  either from the words, the context, the subject-matter, 
  the effects + consequences, or the spirit + reason of 
  the Law. 
   From the latter method of interpretation 
  arises EQUITY, or the correction of that wherein 
  the Law (by reason of its universality) is deficient. 
        Blackstone’s Anal. B. 1. ch 2. p 3.”190 
 
“Equity of the Statute” asks what the legislators would have done if confronted with a 
situation unanticipated by the drafting or the policy of the statute. 
 
  “The preamble 
  of a statute is like a key to open the intent of 
  the makers of the Act; and as it is deem’d true, 
  good Arguments may be drawn from it.  But the 
  best way to explain a statute is to con- 
  sider what answer the Lawgivers wou’d pro- 
  bably have given to the question made, 
   if propos’d to them.”191   
 
Again, relying heavily on Coke, Quincy noted that words of a statute should be construed 
to promote consistency within the statute, and “must be taken in a law full + rightful 
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188 Id., p. 89 [77]. 
189 See discussion at note 46, supra.   
190 Law Commonplace, p. 89 [77]. 
191 Id., p. 91 [79]. 
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sense.”192  “That construction must be made of a statute in suppression of the mischief, 
and in advancement of the remedy.”193 
 
 While nothing in Quincy’s Law Commonplace suggested the judicial review of 
Marshall’s Marbury v. Madison (1803),194 or even the dicta of Dr. Bonham’s Case 
(1610),195 the doctrines of contextual interpretation and “Equity of the Statute” could, in 
practice, give the judiciary a powerful role, as Coke intended.  Quincy also seemed aware 
of the dangers of too much “equity of intendment.”196  In theory, “Equity of the Statute” 
was not a substitution of the views of the judge for the legislator, but solely the perfection 
of the legislator’s will by remedying oversights.  Where statutes are penal, or “made in 
any right of the subject,” they should be “strictly construed” to prevent unanticipated 
harm.197  Quincy also copied a section from Bedell v. Constable, Vaughan’s Reports 
(London, 1677) that “[w]hen an acts alters the Common Law, the meaning shall not be 
strain’d beyond words, except in cases of publick utility, when the end of the act appears 
to be larger than the words themselves.”198 
 
 Some of Quincy’s excerpts seem directly contradictory, such as the section from 
Hobart’s Reports (1641), “Judges have liberty + authority over statutes to mould them to 
the truest + best use, according to reason + best use, according to reason + best 
convenience,”199 and the immediately following selection from Beccaria, especially 
emphasized by Quincy, with a special caption: 
 
  “The Danger      There is nothing more dangerous, 
  Of Considering ye      than the common axioms: the spirit 
  Spirit of Laws       of the laws is to be considered.  To 
   adopt it is to give way to the torrent 
   of opinion.  This may seem a paradox 
  to vulgar minds, which are more strongly affect- 
  ed by the smallest disorder before their eyes, than 
  by the most pernicious, tho’ remote, consequences 
  produced by one false principle adopted by a 
  nation.  Marquis Beccaria’s Essay on Crimes 
  + punishments. p. 15, 6. quod vide.”200 
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Beccaria, coming from a civilian tradition, might be expected to have more deference to 
the letter of the code or statute, but the excerpt was followed by another from Entick v. 
Carrington (1765), Wilson’s Reports, p. 290, where the issue was whether a statute 
should be expansively read to permit a search warrant by the Secretary of State, rather 
than a constable. 
 
  “When ye code of laws is 
  once fixed, it should be observed in ye literal 
  sense, + nothing more is left to ye judge, than 
  to determine, whether an action be, or be not 
  conformable to the written Law.  When the rule 
  of right which ought to direct the actions of 
  the philosopher, as well as the ignorant, is 
  a matter of controversy, not a fact, the 
  people are slaves to the magistrates.  Ibid. 16. 17. 
  The best way to construe modern statu- 
  tes is to follow ye words thereof.  Per Cur: Wilson’s 
   Rep: 290. Entick v. Carrington”201 
 
 Quincy’s choice of extracts was not random.  He seems keenly aware both of how 
a too rigid application of statutes can cause unnecessary injustice, and how a too 
expansive interpretation can cause surprise and can prejudice pre-existing rights. In 
addition, as noted before, the Law Commonplace was designed to give Quincy authority 
to argue either side of a contentious case, depending on the clients.  In addition, at the 
close of the “Statutes or Acts” section, he also exhibited some critical judgment.  Quincy 
challenges Sir George Treby’s argument in Horton v. Ruerby that he knew “the intention 
of the Parliament” because “he was present at ye making ye statute…”202 
 
  [Quincy]  “How ye intention of Parliament can 
  be rightly discovered in this way: 
  unless ye informant knew absolute- 
  ly what determined the concurrence 
  of each branch of ye legislature:- qu: 
  wch ye is possible to be known: -and qu: 
  of ye consequences of their mode of 
  determin:g + judging of ye intent of 
  law-makers, and qu: etc.”203 
 
In this Quincy anticipated the jurisprudence of Lon Fuller, and others, who regarded the 
“legislative intent” argument for judicial construction as a transparent fiction.204 
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 Quincy’s Law Commonplace certainly reflected the actual local arguments in 
court on statutory construction.  Derumple v. Clark (Case No. 17) (1763), Reports, p. 38, 
contemporary with the start of the Law Commonplace, was a classic example.  The 
“Province Law called the Tax Act,” the annual tax act passed each year in Massachusetts, 
had for years contained the following language, “where no Contract is, the Landlord shall 
reimburse the Tenant half the Taxes.”205  Here there was no contract, the tenant had paid 
the tax, and sued the landlord for half.  Quincy’s pupil master, Oxenbridge Thacher, 
argued for the defendant landlord. 
 
 “Mr. Thacher, for Defendant. It has been the uninterrupted Custom of this Town 
 for the Tenant to pay the whole Taxes, and though this Law is of very antient 
 Date, (3) we find no Action on it till 1752; so that it always supposed that such a 
 Contract is made.  The Words of the Law are not – where no express – no written 
 – no verbal – but “where no Contract is.”  And I think the continual paying Rent 
 for several Years without any Demand of Deduction, and several Receipts having 
 been given by the Plaintiff to the Defendant in full of all Accounts, are full 
 Evidence that such was the Intention and Meaning of the Parties, which is a 
 sufficient Contract.  To have this Point called in Question would be big with the 
 greatest Inconveniences.  If Landlords who from Year to Year have received their 
 whole Rents, and given Discharges for them, are to be called to account for many 
 Years’ Taxes, it would be productive of an ample Harvest of Suits, of which 
 perhaps our Brotherhood might reap the Gleanings.”206 
 
 
Auchmuty, for the plaintiff tenant, replied: 
 
 Mr. Auchmuty.  As to the Custom of the Town; if there had been no Law, that 
 might have been an Argument of some Weight; but the Law is express, and shall 
 any pretended Custom control it?  As for the Consequences they must not be 
 considered – if it is Law, it is Law, &c.”207 
 
Despite the plain words of the statute, the court held for the defendant.  Justice Lynde 
observed: 
 
 “Justice Lynde.  I always thought that the Intention of this Law was not to affect 
 the Taxes in such Towns as this, but merely where Farms are let to the Halves, 
 where the Benefit of the Estate being divided, ‘tis but just the Charges should be 
 divided too.  I think the Custom of the Town is a great Thing, and that the Parties 
                                                                                                                                                 
204 See Fuller’s classical parable of statutory construction and application, “The Case of the Speluncean 
Explorers,” 62 Harv. L. Rev. 616 (1949). 
205 Quincy’s Reports, p. 38. 
206 Id., pp. 38-39. 
207 Id., p. 39. 
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 are to be supposed to intend according to the Custom.  I think the Evidence 
 sufficient to prove a Contract within the Intendment of the Law.”208 
 
Perhaps even more striking, Chief Justice Hutchinson appealed to “Equity”.  Here there 
was no evidence in the Reports of legislative intention, i.e. “Equity of the Statute.”  This 
was pure “judicial” equity, i.e. judicial “discretion”! 
 
 “Ch. Just.  You are to go according to Law and Evidence  Where the Law is in 
 any Case doubtfull and the Equity of it plain, you should verge towards Equity.  
 Custom shall not be placed in Opposition to Law, but it may be a Circumstance 
 going to interpret the Intention of the Parties.”209 
 
 An even more important case was Bishop v. Brig Freemason (Case 78, 1763), 
Reports, p. 387, an Admiralty case before Admiralty Judge Chambers Russell.  Here the 
question focused on the word “importation” as used in the Act of 15 Car. 2, c. 7, §6, 
which stated: 
 
 “No Commodity of the Growth, Production or Manufacture of Europe shall be 
 imported into any Land, Island, Plantation, Colony, Territory, or Place to His 
 Majesty belonging in Asia, Africa, or America, (Tangier only excepted) but what 
 all be bona fide and “without Fraud laden  and shipped in England, Wales or the 
 Town of Berwick upon Tweed, and in English built Shipping.”210 
 
The Freemason had been seized, loaded with French wine, entering Boston harbor.  The 
wine had not been unloaded, and the Master claimed that the ship “came from Bourdeaux 
being bound to St. Eustatia,” with no intent to land the wine.  Was there “importation?”  
Auchmuty argued for the validity of the seizure. 
 
“Whether she [the Brig Freemason] is within the Meaning of this Act, which is 
for the Encouragement of Trade:  What the Trade is that is to be encouraged, Sec. 
5 shews: It is to render Great Britain the Staple.  The only sensible Meaning of 
Importation is Bringing in, exclusive of Landing.  13&14 Car. 2, ch. 13 shews this 
ought to be the Construction.  In the same Sense ‘tis taken in 13 & 14 Car. 2, ch. 
19, and in 13 & 14, Car. 2, ch. 11, §§22, 23, and in 22 & 23 Car. 2, ch. 26.  From 
these Acts, I think it was evident that Bringing in is all they meant by Importation, 
as all these Acts use the Words.  The Statute 6 Geo. 2, ch. 13, §§2 & 3, makes a 
Distinction between Landing and Importing: They designed to make a Distinction 
between Goods that are customable, and not forfeited till Landing, and those 
which, begin prohibited, are forfeited by bare Importation.  If these Laws should 
be otherwise construed, they would be completely evaded. – For, if they have not 
a fair  Opportunity of Running, they will Report.  The Consequences of this Act 
to any particular Plantation cannot now be considered.  There is a great Difference 
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between Goods that may be imported and pay a Duty, and those which are 
absolutely prohibited.”211 
 
Oxenbridge Thacher, Quincy’s pupil master, argued for the Brig Freemason: 
 
 “Let us consider whether it comes within the Letter of this Act.  If any Vessell 
 approaches or comes into a Port, without any Intent to unload, shall her Cargo 
 said to be imported?  Can a Thing be said to be imported, because the Vessell that 
 holds it comes into Port?  What Mischief do they mean to suppress?  ‘Tis lawfull 
 for us to be Carriers from one French Port to another.  Shall then an English 
 Vessell, Carrier for other Nations, leaking and wanting Provisions, with Liberty 
 from the Owner to touch at an English Port for a few Days to procure Store, not 
 be permitted to touch at such English Port?  I challenge an Instance of a Seizure 
 on this Act, till Landing or Bulk broken.  Can it be said that this Stopping is the 
 Mischief?  ‘Tis supplying the Colonies that is intended to be prevented.  This will 
 be still plainer from several Acts the Advocate has cited.  13 & 14 Car. 2, ch. 13 
 §2.  The Meaning must still be the same.”212 
 
 Not surprisingly, the Vice-Admiralty judge, “having heard Council for two whole 
days, gave his opinion that landing was not necessary to make an importation contrary to 
that Act,” arguing that “effectually the Act would be defeated” if the contrary were 
true.213  Whether Quincy assembled the section of his Law Commonplace on “Statutes or 
Acts” while assisting Thacher in this case cannot be known, but the Brig Freemason 
certainly illustrated why a colonist might favor a “strict construction” of statutory 
language!  Even more impressive, ample authority for both sides of the argument were 
assembled in Quincy’s Law Commonplace. 
 
 There were several more important statutory construction cases, not the least 
being the historic argument over the authority given by “Acts of 15 Car. 2 ch. 22 and 7 28 
of Wm & Mary” in Paxton’s Case of the Writs of Assistance (Case No. 22, 1761) 
Reports, p. 51 and the question of whether the Statute of Frauds (1677) 29 Charles II, c. 
3, was adopted in Massachusetts before the colony “made a like law here,” Prov. St. 4 W. 
& M. (1692).  These cases, and more, are discussed at length in the annotations to the 
Reports.  But it is appropriate to close this discussion with a revealing sidelight of the 
Boston Massacre Cases of 1771, The Petition of the Jurors in the Trials of Captain 
Preston and the British Soldiers (Case No. 77, 1771), Reports, p. 382.  The issue was 
simple: did the “Act of 4 of W. & M. c. 12, (3)” provide authority for reimbursing the 
severely oppressed jurors for a six day trial for Preston and a nine day trial for the 
soldiers, “said Jurys being kept together every Night by two or more Officers.”?214 
 
 The text of the Act reads as follows: 
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 “The Act is intitled “An Act for the Settlement of the Bounds and defraying the 
 PUBLICK and NECESSARY CHARGES arising within each respective County 
 in this Province.”  “And for the due and equal raising of Monies for defraying of 
 the Charges arising within each respective County, for the necessary Repairs and 
 Amendments of Bridges, Prisons, the Maintenance of poor Prisoners, and ALL 
 PROPER COUNTY CHARGES, It is enacted, that, when and so often as there 
 shall be NEED OF RAISING MONEY FOR THE ENDS AFORESAID in any 
 County, the Justices in Quarter Sessions for such County receiving Information 
 thereof from the County Treasurer, shall agree and determine the whole Sum to be 
 raised, &c., and issue their Order, &c., to assess the same upon the Inhabitants, 
 &c.”215 
 
After “Debates at the Bar [that] took up the Day,” the Justices (only Mr. Justice Dunbar 
doubting) were unanimously of Opinion that the Prayer of the Petition of the jurors 
should not be granted.”216 It can be justly doubted if this was a popular decision.  Here 
Quincy interjected his own comments, printed in the Boston Gazette, Monday, May 20, 
1771, confirming the impression given by his Law Commonplace that he distrusted what 
today we would call “judicial activism”. 
 
 “It gives a most sensible Pleasure in these Times to find a Court of Justice 
 deciding a Point of Law against an Extension of their Power: especially, as that 
 Power would affect the Purse of the Subject – This Decision is of no small 
 Moment; its Importance will appear more conspicuous upon a close Examen and 
 Reflection.  However, it is yet a Matter of deep Concern with some that the 
 Superiour Court seem to entertain a different Opinion on the Point in Question.  
 They ordered a Recommendation of the Allowance to be made.  They are 
 presumed to know the Law, and we are willing to suppose they would not 
 influence, and much less recommend to a subordinate Court the Exertion of an 
 illegal Power; a Power derogatory to the natural and primary Right of the Subject 
 over his Property; and of the highest Consequence to the Community, considered 
 in a separate or collective View”217 
 
 All in all, the sections “Of Laws” and “Of Statutes or Acts” in the Law 
Commonplace remain of great importance.  When read, as intended, with Quincy’s 
accompanying Reports, they testify eloquently to Quincy’s legal ability, and the 
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 The topics discussed only scratch the surface of what there is to learn from the 
Law Commonplace.  For the economic historian, there are the extensive sections on 
“Insurance,”218 “Notes,”219 “Bills of Exchange,”220 and “Arbitrament, Arbitrators & 
Award,”221 which give an excellent sense of how business was actually done.  For the 
proceduralist, a member of an esoteric tribe to which this editor belongs, there is a mass 
of information under captions from “Action,”222 “Arrest,”223and “Attachment”224 to 
“Tryal”225 and “Variance.”226  What modern lawyers would call “Real Property” was 
represented by “Estates,”227 “Freehold,”228”Joint Tenants,”229 “Of Lands, Tenements or 
Hereditaments,”230 “Lease, Lessor + Lessee,”231 “Of Releases,”232 and other captions.  
“Torts” was represented by “Account,”233 “Battery,”234 “Trespass,”235 “Words Actionable 
or Not,”236 and “contract” by “Accord”237 “assumpsit”238 “Obligation + Deed,”239 and 
“Usury.”240  The entire modern law school curriculum, as envisioned by Joseph Story and 
structured by Christopher Columbus Langdell, can find its eighteenth-century counterpart 
in these pages.  Perhaps more to the point, today’s practicing lawyer will find this a 
remarkably familiar world, and the Law Commonplace easily accessible. 
 
 Of course, at one level, Quincy’s Law Commonplace was just a notebook full of 
extracts, largely from English sources, copied out by a still very young man.  Quincy was 
just over nineteen when he began.  But this was no ordinary young man, and these were 
not ordinary times.  Many surviving “commonplace books” were truly “commonplace,” 
but not this one.  Quincy had a subtle and brilliant mind, and there is a powerful and 
unmistakable picture created by this quilt of authorities and precedents.  The Law 
Commonplace will never be as accessible to the layperson as Quincy’s Political 
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Commonplace or the Southern Journal, but it can tell us a great deal about the origins of 
American legal education and American law.  Read together with Quincy’s remarkable 
Reports,241 the Law Commonplace paints a surprisingly complete and nuanced picture of 
Quincy’s legal world, at the birth of a nation. 
                                                 
241 Quincy’s Reports will be republished as volumes 3 and 4 of Portrait of a Patriot: The Major Political 
and Legal Papers of Josiah Quincy Junior, supra. 
